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I. INTRODUCTION 
A deep puzzle lies at the heart of international law. It is “law” binding on 
the United States,1 and yet it is not always enforceable in the courts. One of the 
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 1. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”). 
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great challenges for scholars, judges, and practitioners alike has been to make 
some sense of this puzzle—some might call it a paradox—and to figure out 
when international law can be used in U.S. courts and when it cannot. 
The Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Constitution would seem to solve this 
puzzle. It says, after all, that “Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be supreme Law of the Land.”2 Yet early 
in the country’s history, the Supreme Court distinguished between treaties 
“equivalent to an act of the legislature”—and therefore enforceable in the 
courts—and those “the legislature should execute”—meaning they could not be 
enforced in the courts until implemented by Congress and the President.3 Thus 
began a cottage industry devoted to determining when international law was 
enforceable in the courts. 
Just when scholars had more or less come to a settled understanding of 
the status of international law in the courts—or at least agreed to disagree—the 
Supreme Court reentered the fray. Beginning in the 1990s, foreign nationals 
convicted of capital offenses and sentenced to death had begun challenging 
their convictions on the grounds that the arresting authorities had violated the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations4 (Vienna Convention), which the 
United States had ratified, by failing to inform them that they had the right to 
contact their consulates.5 U.S. courts refused to provide the relief the foreign 
nationals sought, and two of the cases eventually made their way to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ).6 That Court twice held that the United 
States had breached its obligations to its treaty partners by failing to notify the 
consulates of foreign nationals upon their arrest.7 In the second of these two 
cases,8 the Court held that the United States had violated the Vienna 
Convention by failing to inform fifty-one Mexican nationals of their rights 
under the Convention upon their arrest.9 The Court declared that the United 
States was obligated to provide the fifty-one individuals—including petitioner 
José Ernesto Medellín—“review and reconsideration of the conviction and 
sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the 
Convention.”10 
 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 3. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), overruled on other grounds, United States 
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). 
 4. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
 5. The first of these—presented to the Supreme Court in the context of a last-minute request 
for a stay of execution and a writ of certiorari—resulted in a per curiam decision in that Court declining 
to review the case on its merits. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). The petitioner was therefore 
executed. 
 6. The United States had ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention, which provided 
that “Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the 
Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.” Optional 
Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. 1, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 
U.N.T.S. 487. 
 7. LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27). 
 8. In the first case, the petitioner had been executed by the time the merits decision was 
handed down. Id. Thus no further proceedings occurred. 
 9. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). 
 10. Id. at 51 (quoting LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 466, at 514). 
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Medellín returned to the U.S. courts to enforce the holding, seeking the 
review and reconsideration called for by the ICJ. The Texas courts refused—in 
part on the grounds that the ICJ’s decision was not directly enforceable in 
domestic courts. The U.S. Supreme Court surprised many observers by 
agreeing. In Medellín v. Texas,11 the Court reasoned that the treaties granting 
jurisdiction to the ICJ were non-self-executing and thus not enforceable unless 
implemented into law by Congress. They were, in other words, among those 
treaties the legislature must execute.12 Congress, of course, had not passed 
implementing legislation—probably because nearly everyone had long 
assumed that the treaties at issue were legally binding, making implementing 
legislation unnecessary. 
A significant line in the decision was buried in the footnotes. In the now-
famous third footnote, the Court endorsed a “background presumption” against 
finding that treaties confer private rights or private rights of action, even when 
they are self-executing.13 This represented a significant shift away from U.S. 
courts’ historical approach to interpreting treaties. Indeed, it effectively 
reversed what had, during most of the country’s history, been a background 
presumption in favor of finding treaties to confer private rights of action 
whenever they conferred private rights. The decision thus highlighted, and 
heightened, uncertainty surrounding the enforcement of treaties in the U.S. 
courts. 
This Article examines the status of treaties in U.S. courts—and how the 
international legal commitments expressed in our treaties “come home”—in 
three interlocking steps. First, it seeks in Part I to provide an account of the 
legal and historical context of Medellín—examining both the case law that led 
up to the decision and how the lower courts have since responded. Even before 
the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, much had changed in the way the courts 
enforced treaties created under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.14 During the 
first 170 years of U.S. history, courts generally applied a strong presumption 
that private litigants could use treaties to press their claims in court. That all 
began to change just after World War II, as international treaties—and 
international human rights treaties in particular—proliferated. Still, the old 
presumption remained in place for certain categories of treaties. Understanding 
this transformation enables a deeper appreciation of the impact Medellín is 
already having, and will likely have in the future, on the enforcement of 
international law in U.S. courts. 
Second, the Article aims in Part II to place direct enforcement of 
 
 11. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 12. Id. at 514, 516. 
 13. Id. at 506 n.3. 
 14. Under Article II, the President is authorized to “make” treaties with the advice and consent 
of two-thirds of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur . . . .”). This Article focuses exclusively on Article II treaties. When it uses the term 
“international law,” it is referring only to such treaties. For more on executive agreements, see Oona A. 
Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United 
States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236 (2008) [hereinafter Hathaway, Treaties’ End], and Oona A. Hathaway, 
Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L. J. 141 (2009). 
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international law through private rights of action into broader context in a 
second way—by looking at all the ways in which international law can be 
enforced in U.S. courts. The direct enforcement of treaties called into doubt in 
the wake of Medellín is only a part of the picture. Treaties are enforced in U.S. 
courts in several other ways as well—through what we term “indirect 
enforcement,” “defensive enforcement,” and “interpretive enforcement.” These 
other ways of enforcing international commitments in U.S. courts are often 
ignored in the scholarly literature about judicial enforcement of international 
law. Many scholars treat one or the other in isolation, but no one considers 
them as a whole. As a result, advocates and critics of international law alike 
have placed too much emphasis on the use of international law as a cause of 
action for private litigants. This, in turn, has caused them to overestimate 
Medellín’s likely effect on the enforcement of international law in U.S. courts. 
Finally, in Part III, this Article considers steps that can be taken to 
increase the likelihood that treaties will continue to be enforced directly, even 
in a post-Medellín world. We offer three proposals for how each of the 
branches of the federal government can strengthen the enforcement of 
international law. First, Congress could pass legislation providing for the 
judicial enforcement of certain subsets of Article II treaties. Second, the 
President and Senate could adopt a clear statement rule for treaty ratification—
a practice through which the President submits treaties to the Senate for 
ratification with clear statements about whether they are self-executing, and 
through which the clear statement becomes part of the treaty’s formal text or 
accompanying documents. Third, the executive branch could pursue direct 
enforcement of treaty obligations itself. Where treaties are clear that private 
litigants lack rights of action, the U.S. government could bring affirmative 
lawsuits against state and municipal agencies that refuse to comply with 
treaties, to enjoin those entities from activities that place the United States in 
violation of its international obligations. 
Our proposals each offer a path toward more effective enforcement of 
Article II treaties in U.S. courts. They are only valuable, of course, if the 
United States has an interest in abiding by the international legal commitments 
it makes.15 We recognize that there is an ongoing debate about this 
proposition.16 Although proving the proposition that it is in the United States’s 
 
 15. Many scholars have argued that states have an interest in abiding by their international 
legal commitments, arriving at the same conclusion in quite different ways. See, e.g., ROBERT O. 
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 
(1984) (arguing that strong international institutions and international laws promote states’ 
individualistic objectives through facilitating cooperation); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based 
Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1849 (2002) (arguing that states should (and do) 
obey international legal commitments, such as treaty commitments, because “[a] country that develops a 
reputation for compliance with international obligations signals to other countries that it is cooperative. 
This allows the state to enjoy long-term relationships with other cooperative states, provides a greater 
ability to make binding promises, and reduces the perceived need for monitoring and verification”); 
Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, FOREIGN AFF., 
Nov.-Dec. 2000 (critiquing the “New Sovereigntists” for failing to appreciate the benefits to states in 
general and the United States in particular of complying with international legal obligations). 
 16. For a critical view, see, for example, John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in 
International Affairs?, 10 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 26-27 (2000) (arguing that treaties are 
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interest to abide by its international law commitments is not a goal of this 
Article, we note at least two reasons to believe it is true. First, when treaties 
provide reciprocal benefits, the United States clearly gains from the 
enforcement of the agreements by other parties to the treaty. Indeed, for the 4.5 
million Americans who live overseas and the 60 million who traveled abroad 
last year17—not to mention the U.S. businesses whose trillions of dollars in 
investments are protected by a variety of international treaties—the ability to 
enforce treaty-based rights abroad is essential.18 But other countries are less 
likely to observe their treaty obligations if the United States fails to live up to 
its side of the bargain. A private right of action is often the best way to 
guarantee this compliance, for the federal judiciary is in a unique position to 
press the political branches to honor the country’s international commitments, 
particularly when those commitments benefit individuals.19 Second, regardless 
of the value one may place on any given international agreement—or the 
benefit that the United States receives from that particular treaty—the United 
States has a broader and deeper interest in demonstrating its capacity to abide 
by the commitments it makes. Until the United States chooses to end an 
international legal commitment (which it ordinarily can do by simply providing 
notice to this effect), it is obligated to comply with the agreement as a matter of 
international law.20 Failure to comply with such obligations makes the United 
States a law violator potentially subject to sanctions and—likely most harmful 
of all—an unreliable treaty partner.21 For these reasons, even those who dislike 
or disapprove of particular international agreements should wish to see the 
United States live up to the commitments that it has made. 
 
not legally binding and the United States should be able to ignore its treaty obligations to promote its 
sovereign interests); Eric Posner, Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1901, 1916 (2003) (“[W]hat I have said should be enough to cast doubt on the notion that 
states have a moral obligation to obey international law.”); cf. Curtis A. Bradley, International 
Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1589-91 
(2003) (arguing that treaties should have diminished status domestically, until they are implemented by 
Congress, given “delegation” and democratic legitimacy concerns); Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming 
International Law from Extra-Territoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 822-27 (2009) (describing how 
“Sovereigntists” are skeptical of international law and particularly of multilateral treaties, because such 
provisions undermine state sovereignty).  
 17. Fulfilling Our Treaty Obligations and Protecting Americans Abroad: Hearing on S. 11994 
Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong., 1 (2011) (statement of Undersecretary Patrick F. 
Kennedy, U.S. Dep’t of State). 
 18. See, e.g., id. at 2-7 (explaining the importance of the rights to consular notification and 
access, protected by the Vienna Convention, for the thousands of Americans in foreign custody); c.f. 
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, at 524 (2008) (recognizing that the United States had “plainly 
compelling” interests in complying with its obligations under the Vienna Convention, such as “ensuring 
the reciprocal observance of the Vienna Convention, protecting relations with foreign governments, and 
demonstrating commitment to the role of international law”). 
 19. See William M. Carter, Jr., Treaties as Law and the Rule of Law: The Judicial Power To 
Compel Domestic Treaty Implementation, 69 MD. L. REV. 344, 359-80 (2010) (contending that federal 
courts should use their mandamus power to compel the U.S. government to comply with its human 
rights treaty obligations, even for non-self-executing treaties, because those treaties are still binding 
federal law under the Supremacy Clause). 
 20. Indeed, the most fundamental proposition of international law is pacta sunt servanda—
agreements must be kept. 
 21. For more on this, see Oona A. Hathaway & Scott S. Shapiro, Outcasting: The Enforcement 
of Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252 (2011). 
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II.  THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT HOME 
To understand modern jurisprudence on the enforcement of international 
law in U.S. courts, it is important to disentangle the meaning of “self-executing 
treaties,” “private rights,” and “private rights of action.” A self-executing treaty 
is a treaty that creates a domestic legal obligation in the absence of 
implementing legislation.22 A private right is a right that accrues to an 
individual.23 A private right of action24 allows a private party to seek a remedy 
from a court for the violation of a private right provided by a treaty.25 
Treaties that may be enforced in court by private litigants are often 
referred to as “self-executing” treaties. This is technically accurate, though it 
leads many to the incorrect assumption that treaties that are “self-executing” 
and those that create “private rights of action” are always one and the same. In 
fact, they are not. As the Restatement (Third) puts it: “[W]hether a treaty is 
self-executing is a question distinct from whether the treaty creates private 
rights or remedies.”26 
Although all treaties that create private rights of action are self-executing, 
not all self-executing treaties necessarily create private rights or private rights 
of action. For example, a treaty providing for military cooperation between two 
countries would likely create no private right, while a treaty involving 
contractual or property rights likely would. A treaty providing for the 
protection of civilians during times of armed conflict would confer new, private 
rights on such persons, but that treaty could be enforced in federal court only if 
there is a private right of action to bring lawsuits in federal court for violations 
of the treaty.27 
 
 22. As the Court put it in Medellín, a treaty that is self-executing has “automatic domestic 
effect as federal law upon ratification.” 552 U.S. at 505 n.2. 
 23. For example, a property right, such as that provided by the treaty at issue in Chirac v. 
Chirac’s Lessee, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 271 (1817). 
 24. The phrases “private cause of action” and “private right of action” will be used 
interchangeably throughout this Article. 
 25. For more on the distinction between private rights and private rights of action, see 
McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.3d 485, 489-91 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that even 
though the Treaty of Amity between the United States and Iran is self-executing, creates a property 
right, and provides for a remedy, there is no implied private right of action); see also David Sloss, When 
Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan 
and Sanchez-Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 20, 101-02 (2006) (noting that courts have found 
treaties to be judicially enforceable on behalf of private parties even when the treaty did not create an 
express private right of action). For an excellent article on international law enforcement in U.S. courts 
that touches on many of the same cases discussed here, see Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of 
the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 
(2008). 
 26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 cmt. h (1987). 
 27. For example, U.S. courts have not found the Geneva Conventions to provide a private 
right of action, even though they provide for “full rights and privileges of a protected person under the 
present Convention.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 
774, 808-09 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (noting that the Geneva Conventions are not self-
executing and do not provide a private right of action); Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President 
Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 126-29 (2004) (noting that the majority of 
U.S. courts have held that the Geneva Conventions do not provide a private right of action). A recent 
bilateral investment treaty between the United States and Rwanda provides another example. As the 
Senate Report on the treaty put it: “The resolution of advice and consent contains a statement reflecting 
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Supreme Court jurisprudence prior to the mid-twentieth century, 
however, made no distinctions among self-execution, private rights, and private 
rights of action. During this period, if a treaty dealt with the rights of private 
parties, it was generally treated as self-executing and the source of a private 
right of action.28 This presumption became unsettled in the second half of the 
twentieth century. The lower courts adopted a less consistent approach to 
international agreements, as some began to look for express language stating 
that a treaty was self-executing or contemplated a private right of action for 
individuals. This newfound skepticism was likely prompted in part by the 
emergence of large numbers of human rights treaties—and growing concerns 
that these treaties could create private rights of action that would be pursued in 
U.S. courts.  
In Medellín,29 a majority of the Supreme Court endorsed in dicta a 
presumption against finding private rights or a private right of action. In a 
footnote, the Court explained that, “Even when treaties are self-executing in the 
sense that they create federal law, the background presumption is that 
international agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, 
generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in 
domestic courts.”30 Subsequent rulings by a number of lower courts have relied 
upon this dicta and the Medellín Court’s discussion of self-execution to reject a 
variety of treaty-based claims—thus, effectively flipping the presumption in 
favor of self-execution and a private right of action that prevailed for a century 
and a half to a presumption against. We trace this evolution below. 
A. Founding to World War II 
For most of the country’s history, the Supreme Court treated the issues of 
self-execution, private rights, and private rights of action as essentially 
indistinguishable.31 Between 1790 and 1947, the Court found a treaty self-
executing on the basis that a private right was secured by the treaty in at least 
twenty-two cases.32 In each case, the Court held not only that the treaty was 
 
the committee’s understanding of the extent to which this Treaty will be self-executing. This provides 
that Articles 3–10 of the Treaty are self-executing and do not confer private rights of action enforceable 
in United States courts.” S. REP. NO. 112-2, at 11 (2011), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/reports/ 
download/?id=05a8bf53-9828-49f9-99ef-dceaf5695afc. 
 28. See John T. Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of Treaties, 
32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1209 (2008) (addressing the understandings of treaty implementation in the 
decades before Foster); David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, The U.S. Supreme 
Court and International Law: Continuity and Change 5 (Aug. 29, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1664773 (“The Supreme Court’s 
approach to treaties shows substantial continuity until the middle of the twentieth century, with 
substantial change after World War II . . . . Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
Court routinely applied treaties to preempt state law. It also played an active role enforcing treaty rights 
on behalf of individuals, even against the federal government.”). 
 29. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer wrote a dissent that was joined 
by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Souter. 
 30. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008) (citations omitted). 
 31. For an examination of the debate over self-execution that includes the pre-Founding 
British practice as well as the role of Congress in the debate, see Parry, supra note 28. 
 32. These cases are cited in Justice Breyer’s Appendix to Medellín. 552 U.S. at 568 app. A 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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self-executing, but also that it created a private right of action. The treaties 
from which the Court inferred this right to private enforcement fell into four 
areas: (1) contract matters; (2) property and inheritance law matters; (3) the 
right to challenge the legality of detention through a writ of habeas corpus; and 
(4) rights to carry on a trade. 
The reasoning of the Court throughout this period followed a consistent 
pattern: if the treaty created a private right—a property right, inheritance right, 
contract right, or habeas corpus right—then the treaty was “self-executing,” and 
there was necessarily a private right of action enabling individuals to enforce 
the right in the courts. The Court reasoned that a treaty conferring rights on 
private individuals did not “address itself”33 to the legislature and therefore did 
not require congressional action to have effect. Rather, such treaties spoke to 
the judiciary, whose role it was to enforce individual rights under the treaties.34 
The Court’s approach during this era is exemplified by the seminal cases 
of Ware v. Hylton,35 Foster v. Neilson,36 and United States v. Percheman.37 In 
Ware, the Court held that the Treaty of Peace, signed between the United States 
and Great Britain in 1783, enabled a British creditor to recover a debt owed to 
him by an American.38 The Court reasoned that because the Peace Treaty 
created a private right for British creditors, it automatically gave rise to an 
implied private right of action. The treaty aimed to protect the contractual 
rights of British creditors, and the Court regarded judicial enforcement of that 
right as a necessary means to that end.39  
Just over three decades later, in Foster v. Neilson, the Supreme Court 
famously elaborated what we now know as the self-execution doctrine. The 
case presented the question of whether a plaintiff had property rights to a plot 
of land in Florida.40 The plaintiff claimed he did, tracing his rights to a transfer 
of land ownership by the government of Spain in 1804. He further claimed that 
the Treaty of Amity, signed between the United States and Spain in 1819, 
solidified his property rights in the land. The defendant argued that Spain 
lacked the power to transfer land ownership in 1804, for it had already ceded its 
sovereignty over the territory in question to France, and France in turn had 
ceded its sovereignty to the United States. The Treaty of Amity was of no 
moment, the defendant claimed, because the initial land transfer was void.  
In resolving the case, Chief Justice John Marshall distinguished between 
treaties “equivalent to an act of the legislature” and those “the legislature must 
execute.”41 The 1819 treaty, he concluded, fell into the latter category, because 
it contemplated future legislative action to put the land transfers to which it 
 
 33. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). 
 34. Id. 
 35. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
 36. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 253. 
 37. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). 
 38. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 199. 
 39. Id. at 239 (“If a British subject . . . prosecuted his just right, it could only be in a court of 
justice.”). 
 40. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 254. 
 41. Id. at 314. 
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referred into effect.42 The plaintiff could not vindicate his alleged property 
rights pursuant to the treaty. 
This case may seem in tension with the presumption during this period in 
favor of self-execution of treaties that create private rights, but in fact it is not. 
In Foster, the central question was whether the 1819 treaty had created or 
preserved personal property rights in the first place, not whether such treaty-
based rights could be enforced. The Court read the treaty to require additional 
legislative action before property rights could vest—in other words, the treaty 
on its own terms was not a source of private rights. Given that there was no 
private property right to enforce, there was certainly no private right of action 
that could be located in the treaty. 
This reading finds support in United States v. Percheman, in which the 
Court came to the opposite conclusion regarding the same set of facts.43 There, 
the Court revisited its earlier holding that the treaty at the heart of the contested 
property rights claims in Florida required legislative action to create private 
rights.44 Contrary to its holding in Foster, the Court held that under customary 
international law and general canons of treaty interpretation, the 1819 treaty 
between Spain and the United States should be read as having preserved the 
preexisting property rights of Florida’s inhabitants.45 The Court explained that 
in Foster, it had not been presented with the Spanish version of the treaty.46 
After reading the Spanish version, the Court was convinced that the English 
version must be interpreted as self-executing to accord with the Spanish 
version.47 Having now found that the treaty of cession did, in fact, preserve 
private property rights, the Court concluded that the treaty obligation to protect 
those rights was self-executing and that an individual could bring an action 
under the treaty.48 
The presumption in favor of finding treaties to be self-executing when 
they created private rights was applied consistently by the courts throughout the 
period of the Founding through the early twentieth century. When examined 
 
 42. Carlos Vázquez has explained that “the modern reader of Foster is left to infer that the 
Court concluded that Article 8 contemplated implementing legislation because the treaty employed 
action verbs (“ratify” and “confirm”) in the future tense.” Carlos M. Vázquez, Foster v. Neilson and 
United States v. Percheman: Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 151, 
168 (John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2007). 
 43. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). 
 44. Id. 
 45. The treaty stated that “[a]ll the grants of land made before the 24th of January 1818 by his 
catholic majesty, or his lawful authorities, in the said territories ceded by his majesty to the United 
States, shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands.” Id. at 88 (citation 
omitted). 
 46. Id. at 89. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. The Supreme Court expressly drew a similar distinction in Fok Young Yo v. United 
States, 185 U.S. 296 (1902). It explained that the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1880, U.S.-
China, Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826, which declared that the government could “‘regulate, limit, or 
suspend’” the immigration of Chinese laborers into the United States “did not refer to the privilege of 
transit, and, as it was not self-executing, the act of May 6, 1882, was passed to carry the stipulation into 
effect.” Fok Young Yo, 185 U.S. at 303. By contrast, it explained, “the provision of this treaty applicable 
here, in recognizing the privilege of transit and providing that it should continue, proceeded on the 
ground of its existence and continuance under governmental regulations, and no act of Congress was 
required.” Id. 
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more closely, these cases give rise to an interesting pattern. As we show below, 
all of the cases involved treaties that created one of four types of private rights: 
contractual, property and inheritance, detention and habeas corpus, and the 
right to carry on a trade. These rights are traditional common law rights. This 
suggests that one likely reason courts were quick to infer that treaty-created 
rights could be enforced through private rights of action in U.S. courts is that 
the private rights were ones that had always been treated as judicially 
enforceable under the English common law. If that is true, it helps explain why 
courts were less willing to apply this same presumption, of self-execution, to 
the new treaties that emerged in the mid-twentieth century. The rest of this 
Section examines the treaties of the earlier period according to the four types of 
private rights they created, setting the stage for an examination of the evolution 
in the case law as the country entered the modern era. 
1. Contract 
In four cases during the two decades following the Founding, the 
Supreme Court held that the Treaty of Peace between the United States and 
Great Britain, signed after the Revolutionary War in 1783, created private 
contractual rights directly enforceable in U.S. courts.49 The Treaty of Peace 
stated: “It is agreed, that creditors of either side should meet with no lawful 
impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide 
debts theretofore contracted.”50 No mention of rights of action or self-execution 
appeared in the text of the treaty. Nonetheless, when several states passed 
statutes expressly limiting the rights of British creditors to recover debts owed 
to them, the Supreme Court gave relief to British creditors under the Treaty. 
Time and again, the Court held that the Treaty of Peace of 1783 was the 
“supreme law of the land”;51 that it took precedence over contrary state 
statutes;52 that it created a contract right for British creditors;53 and, finally, that 
the contract right was enforceable in U.S. courts by private litigants.54 
2. Property and Inheritance 
In eight cases between 1789 and 1890, the Supreme Court held that a 
treaty created a private property or inheritance right that was directly 
enforceable in U.S. courts.55 In Chirac v. Chirac’s Lessee, decided in 1817, for 
 
 49. Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454, 456-57 (1806) (“This was a bona fide debt, 
contracted before the treaty—and the act of limitations is a legal impediment . . . the treaty says that the 
creditor shall meet with no legal impediment; and the constitution of the United States declares the 
treaty to be the supreme law of the land.—The act of limitations, therefore, must yield to the treaty.”); 
Hannay v. Eve, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 242, 248-49 (1806); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 239 (1796) 
(“If a British subject . . . prosecuted his just right [under the Treaty], it could only be in a court of 
justice.”); Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 2-3 (1794). 
 50. Ware, 3 U.S. at 204. 
 51. See, e.g., Hopkirk, 7. U.S. (3 Cranch) at 457; Ware, 3. U.S. (3 Dall.) at 282-84. 
 52. See, e.g., Hopkirk, 7. U.S. (3 Cranch) at 456-57; Brailsford, 3. U.S. (3 Dall.) at 4. 
 53. See, e.g., Ware, 3. U.S. (3 Dall.) at 285. 
 54. See, e.g., Hopkirk, 7. U.S. (3 Cranch) at 458; Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 285. 
 55. De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1890) (holding that the U.S.-France Treaty of 
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example, the Court held that the 1778 Treaty of Amity between the United 
States and France created a private right for Frenchmen to hold and sell land in 
the United States. Accordingly, the Court allowed a Frenchman’s heirs to 
invoke the treaty in a U.S. court to stop the deceased’s estate from escheating to 
the government.56 Two years later, in Orr v. Hodgson, the Supreme Court 
reached a similar holding with respect to the Treaty of Peace between the 
United States and Britain, signed in 1783.57 In Orr, the Court held that the 
U.S.-Britain treaty had created by its “express terms” a private right for British 
residents to acquire and pass on property by descent, and that this right was 
directly enforceable in court.58 
Although the treaties at issue in Orr, Chirac, and the other six cases 
decided by the Court in this period expressly created private property or 
inheritance rights, none explicitly created private rights of action in the courts 
of the United States. In each case, the Court inferred the rights of action once it 
found that the treaties were meant to create private rights.  
3. Detention and Habeas Corpus 
Three cases decided by the Supreme Court during the 1880s held that a 
treaty had endowed persons with a private right either to be released from 
detention or to file for habeas corpus review, when detained by authorities in 
violation of the treaty. The first was the 1884 case of Chew Heong v. United 
States,59 in which a Chinese laborer who had traveled from the United States to 
Hawaii was detained upon attempting to reenter the United States. He filed a 
habeas petition challenging his detention, arguing that it violated an express 
provision of a treaty between the United States and China granting laborers the 
 
1853 created a private right for French residents in the United States to pass on property and for the 
heirs to claim that property, and that these rights were enforceable in state court); Hauenstein v. 
Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 484, 486, 490 (1879) (holding that the U.S.-Swiss Confederation Treaty of 1850 
created a private right of Swiss residents to “withdraw and export the proceeds [of their land] . . . 
without difficulty” if those persons were domiciled in a state that did not allow foreigners to take 
property “by descent or inheritance,” and that it is was the U.S. court’s “duty to give [those rights] full 
effect”); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833) (holding that the U.S.-Spanish treaty of 
cession for the state of Florida preserved the property rights of Florida’s inhabitants and made those 
rights enforceable by private rights of action); United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691 (1832) 
(also holding that the U.S.-Spanish treaty of cession preserved property rights of inhabitants of Florida); 
Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 453 (1819); Chirac v. Chirac’s Lessee, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 271 
(1817) (see infra note 56); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding that the 
U.S.-Britain Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation of 1794 created private rights for a British 
Lord in the United States to devise his land); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 
110 (1801) (holding that the U.S.-French Treaty of 1801 created a private right of action and stating that 
“where a treaty is the law of the land, and as such affects the rights of parties litigating in court, that 
treaty as much binds those rights and is as much to be regarded by the court as an act of congress.”). 
 56. Chirac, 15 U.S. at 270-71 (“[W]e are all of opinion that the treaty between the United 
States and France, ratified in 1778, enabled the subjects of France to hold lands in the United States. 
That treaty [also] declared that . . . ‘They may, by testament, donation, or otherwise, dispose of their 
goods . . . and their heirs, subjects of the said United States, whether residing in France or elsewhere, 
may succeed them ab intestat . . . .’”). 
 57. Orr, 17 U.S. at 453. 
 58. Id. at 463 (“[H]er title was completely confirmed, free from the taint of alienage; and that 
by the express terms of the treaty, it might lawfully pass to her heirs.” (emphasis added)). 
 59. 112 U.S. 536 (1884). 
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right to “go and come of their own free will.”60 The Supreme Court agreed and 
ordered his release from detention.61 
Two years later, in United States v. Rauscher,62 the Supreme Court 
considered whether to order the release of a detainee who had been extradited 
and detained for a crime not specified in the extradition treaty between the 
United States and Britain under which he had been extradited.63 The Court 
concluded that it was obligated to order the prisoner’s release. The Rauscher 
case is particularly interesting because it involved several steps of inferential 
reasoning by the Court. First, it located a private right of detainees to be free of 
charges for crimes not specified in the extradition treaty.64 Next, it located a 
private right of action, because the treaty was “supreme law of the land, of 
which the courts are bound to take judicial notice, and to enforce in any 
appropriate proceeding the rights of persons growing out of that treaty.”65 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that any detainee “restrained of his liberty in 
violation of the Constitution or a law or a treaty of the United States” may seek 
a writ of habeas corpus. If his allegations were found to be “well founded, he 
w[as to] be discharged.”66 
The Court came to a similar conclusion in 1887 in Mali v. Keeper of the 
Common Jail.67 There, the Supreme Court held that a bilateral treaty between 
the United States and Belgium created a private right to be free of detention in 
the United States for crimes not covered by the treaty.68 The treaty was “the 
supreme law of the United States.”69 The defendant could, therefore, “enforce 
his rights under the treaty by writ of habeas corpus in any proper court of the 
United States.”70 
4. Right to “Carry on Trade” 
In Asakura v. City of Seattle, decided in 1924, the Supreme Court 
considered whether a Seattle city ordinance prohibiting noncitizens from 
obtaining a business license violated a treaty between the United States and 
Japan.71 The Treaty of Amity between the United States and Japan provided 
that “‘[t]he citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall 
 
 60. Id. at 538-39, 542. 
 61. Id. at 560. 
 62. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). 
 63. Id. at 430-32 
 64. Id. at 418 (“‘[A] treaty may . . . confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of 
the nations residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, 
and which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country . . . . And 
when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty for a 
rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a statute.’” (quoting the Head Money Cases, 112 
U.S. 580 (1884)). 
 65. Id. at 419. 
 66. Id. at 431. 
 67. 120 U.S. 1 (1887). 
 68. Id. at 17. The treaty, the Court explained, gave “the consul of Belgium exclusive 
jurisdiction over the offense which it [was] alleged ha[d] been committed.” Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. 265 U.S. 332 (1924). 
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have liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other to carry on 
trade.’”72 The plaintiff, relying on the treaty, sued to enjoin the enforcement of 
the Seattle ordinance.73 Without addressing the question directly, the Court 
inferred a private right of action from the text of the treaty. The Court noted 
that the treaty was one of many treaties meant to provide for “the protection of 
the citizens of one country residing in the territory of another.” It then 
concluded that the treaty “operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, 
state or national; and it will be applied and given authoritative effect by the 
courts.”74 The Court enjoined the enforcement of the ordinance against the 
plaintiff.75 
B. World War II to Medellín 
In the period following World War II, both the Supreme Court’s approach 
and the approach of the lower federal courts towards the enforcement of treaties 
in U.S. courts was less consistent than it had been in the prior century and a 
half.76 The courts continued to regard treaties benefitting private parties as self-
executing and capable of being enforced by those parties through lawsuits. But 
they began taking a more skeptical approach toward treaties regulating 
relationships between sovereign states, as well as toward treaties regulating the 
relationship between the state and the individual. This shift, we shall see, may 
be traced at least in part to a backlash against the emerging human rights 
revolution and the threat some feared it posed to racial segregation and Jim 
Crow. 
1. The Presumption in Favor of Enforcement Weakens 
The Supreme Court—which has exercised control over its own docket 
through certiorari jurisdiction since the 1920s—did not choose to address many 
cases involving the enforcement of international treaties during the post-World 
War II period. In those it did accept, it began to develop a less consistent 
approach to treaty enforcement than it had applied in the previous 150 years. It 
continued to consider a number of treaties—particularly those affecting 
economic or commercial relations between individuals and those addressing 
transnational liability or litigation—self-executing and capable of direct 
enforcement in U.S. courts. It reached such judgments in cases involving 
aircraft liability treaties,77 a multilateral convention concerning ship-owners’ 
 
 72. Id. at 340 (quoting the Treaty of Amity, U.S.-Japan, Apr. 5, 1911, 37 Stat. 1504). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 341. 
 75. Id. at 343. 
 76. Cf. Sloss et al., supra note 28, at 8 (“[A]s late as 1945 the Court’s approach to treaties 
remained generally consistent with its approach over the previous 150 years. After the Second World 
War, however, the Court’s application of treaties as judicially enforceable law changed substantially. 
The Court continued vigorously to apply treaties regulating relationships among private parties. But in 
contrast to earlier periods, the Court declined to use treaties as an instrument to justify judicial 
supervision of the political branches in the exercise of their public functions.” (citation omitted)). 
 77. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) 
(“[T]he Convention is a self-executing treaty. Though the Convention permits individual signatories to 
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liability,78 a treaty governing international discovery rules,79 and several 
bilateral treaties setting forth protections for investors and inheritors.80 Yet the 
Court adopted a newly skeptical posture to other types of treaties. The Court 
was hesitant to declare that the treaty provided a private right of action in cases 
that turned on the new International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),81 an extradition treaty with human rights implications,82 and treaties 
regulating the maritime industry on the high seas.83 
The Supreme Court did not offer the lower courts a consistent standard by 
which to judge which treaties should be treated as self-executing and giving 
rise to a private right of action and which should not. Left without clear 
guidance, the lower federal courts developed a bifurcated approach to treaty 
enforcement that reflected and amplified the Supreme Court’s approach.84 Like 
the Supreme Court, lower courts continued to infer a private right of action for 
treaties that involved economic or commercial relations.85 But they began 
 
convert liability limits into national currencies by legislation or otherwise, no domestic legislation is 
required to give the Convention the force of law in the United States.”). For similar cases assuming 
aircraft liability treaties to be self-executing, see Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 649, 657 
(2004); El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 161-63, 176 (1999); and Zicherman 
v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 221, 231 (1996). 
 78. United States v. Warren, 340 U.S. 523, 526 (1951) (holding that Article 2 of the 
Shipowners’ Liability Convention was self-executing and that “no Act of Congress is necessary to give 
[it] force”). 
 79. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 524, 533 
(1987) (describing international discovery rules). 
 80. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961) (concerning an 1881 treaty between the 
United States and Serbia that regulated the property rights of citizens of each country); Clark v. Allen, 
331 U.S. 503, 507 (1947) (concerning the 1923 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights 
between the United States and Germany and the testamentary disposition of realty and personalty); see 
also Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 181, 189-90 (1982) (assuming in dicta that a 
Friendship, Navigation and Commerce treaty between the United States and Japan is self-executing and 
confers private rights of action for parties whose rights under the treaty are violated). 
 81. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004) (holding that the ICCPR is not self-
executing and does not confer a private cause of action: “[A]lthough the Covenant does bind the United 
States as a matter of international law, the United States ratified the Covenant on the express 
understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the 
federal courts.”). 
 82. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding that a U.S.-Mexico 
extradition treaty did not confer the private right not to be abducted to stand trial for a crime not 
specified). 
 83. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 U.S. 428, 442 (1989) 
(“Respondents point to the Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the Pan American Maritime 
Neutrality Convention. These conventions, however, only set forth substantive rules of conduct and state 
that compensation shall be paid for certain wrongs. They do not create private rights of action for 
foreign corporations to recover compensation from foreign states in United States courts” (citations 
omitted)). 
 84. Previous work has noted the shifting presumption at the lower court level. See Sloss, supra 
note 25, at 106-10 (finding that beginning around the 1970s, many lower courts created a novel 
assumption that treaties do not confer private rights of action).  
 85. BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petoleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 
2003) (concerning the Convention for International Sale of Goods and holding that the treaty “creates a 
private right of action in federal court”); Delchi Carrier v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (concerning the Convention for the International Sale of Goods); Choi v. Kim, 50 F.3d 244 
(3d Cir. 1995) (concerning the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United 
States of America and The Republic of Korea); Vagenas v. Cont’l Gin Co., 988 F.2d 104, 106 (11th Cir. 
1993) (concerning the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and 
Greece); Irish Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1984) (concerning the Treaty 
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taking a more skeptical approach toward treaties regulating relationships 
between sovereign states (such as international dispute settlement and 
international use of force) and those regulating the relationship between the 
state and individual (most notably the emerging body of human rights treaties 
and international criminal law regimes).86 Furthermore, when federal courts of 
appeal concluded there was no private right of action, they did so on one of two 
grounds: (1) either the treaty was not self-executing, and thus not judicially 
enforceable;87 or (2) regardless of whether the treaty was self-executing, it was 
not intended to benefit private individuals in the first place, and therefore did 
not give rise to a private right of action.88  
 
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Ireland); Saipan v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97-98 (9th Cir. 1974) (concerning the Trusteeship Agreement for the Former 
Japanese Mandated Islands); Board of Cty. Comm’rs of Dade Cty., Fla. v. Aerolineas Peruanasa, S.A., 
307 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962) (concerning the Convention on International Civil Aviation). 
 86. See infra notes 87-88. 
 87. United States v. Casaran-Rivas, 311 F. App’x 269, 272 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A]ny argument 
that the indictment violated the refugee Convention and CAT [Convention Against Torture] Treaty is 
without merit, as the Refugee Convention and CAT Treaty are not self-executing, or subject to relevant 
legislation, and, therefore, do not confer upon aliens a private right of action to allege a violation of their 
terms.”); Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 137 (2d Cir. 2005) (“This declaration [that the 
ICCPR is not self-executing] means that the provisions of the ICCPR do not create a private right of 
action or separate form of relief enforceable in United States courts.”); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 
414 F.3d 233, 257 n.35 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that the ICCPR does not create a private right of 
action because the Senate declared that it is not self-executing); Igartua De La Rosa v. United States, 32 
F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (same); Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 
965, 969 (4th Cir. 1992) (“In sum, we hold that the Hague Convention is not self-executing and, 
therefore, does not, by itself, create a private right of action for its breach.”); Frolova v. Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373-74 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The provisions of the United Nations 
Charter on which plaintiff relies are Articles 55 and 56. We have found no case holding that the U.N. 
Charter is self-executing nor has plaintiff provided us with one . . . . Articles 55 and 56 do not create 
rights enforceable by private litigants in American courts.”); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 
F.2d 774, 808-09 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (equating the issues of self-execution and 
private rights of actions and stating that the treaties which plaintiffs sought to enforce were not self-
executing). 
 88. United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 108, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2007) (concerning a Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty between the Netherlands and holding that the petitioner “cannot demonstrate that the 
treaty creates any judicially enforceable individual right that could be implicated by the government’s 
conduct here”); In re Iraq and Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 115-16 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(concerning the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War: 
“None of the provisions of Geneva Convention IV contain any such express or implied language 
indicating that persons have individual ‘rights’ that may be enforced under the treaty. . . . [t]he 
provisions of Geneva Convention IV state general obligations with regard to the treatment of protected 
persons that are imposed on signatory States.”); United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 197 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (concerning the Vienna Convention: “A strong argument has been made that . . . the Vienna 
Convention is not ambiguous as to whether it creates private rights. [cites Li] . . . In any event . . . even if 
the treaty is ambiguous, the presumption against implying private rights comes into play. . . . [T]he U.S. 
State Department has consistently taken the position that the Vienna Convention does not establish 
rights of individuals, but only state-to-state rights and obligations.”); Comm. of United States Citizens 
Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“Article 94 of the U.N. Charter 
[concerning compliance with ICJ decisions] simply does not confer rights on private individuals. Treaty 
clauses must confer such rights in order for individuals to assert a claim ‘arising under’ them.”); United 
States v. Mann, 829 F.2d 849, 852-53 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The [Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs] and 
letter agreement do not appear to create any individual right in Mann. The letter agreement merely 
recognizes the ability of signatory states to request records from financial institutions in other signatory 
states.”); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1268 (5th Cir. 1979) (concerning the Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and holding that “redress for improper 
seizure in foreign waters is not due to the owner or crew of the vessel involved, but to the foreign 
government whose territoriality has been infringed by the action”); Dreyfus v. Von Flick, 534 F.2d 24, 
30 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that neither the Hague Convention, the Kellogg-Briand Pact nor the Treaty of 
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Several cases illustrate the bifurcated approach of the lower courts to 
treaty enforcement, during the post-War period. Vagenas v. Continental Gin 
Co.89 exemplifies the courts’ adherence to the old presumptions about private 
rights, self-execution, and private rights of action, for treaties dealing with 
economic or commercial obligations,.90 In Vagenas, the Eleventh Circuit 
considered whether to permit Greek creditors to enforce a Greek court 
judgment against an American debtor pursuant to a Friendship, Commerce, and 
Navigation (FCN) Treaty between Greece and the United States.91 FCNs are a 
common category of bilateral treaty that states enter in order to foster trade and 
investment. The FCN between Greece and the United States had mandated that 
U.S. courts treat Greek litigants in a nondiscriminatory manner “with respect to 
access to the courts of justice.”92 In resolving the case, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that the FCN not only granted Greek citizens private rights, but rights that 
were directly enforceable. Namely, the FCN endowed Greek citizens with 
rights of equal treatment in U.S. courts—and this meant they could avail 
themselves of the statute of limitations provided for in Greek courts, just as a 
U.S. citizen would have when seeking to enforce a sister state court judgment.93 
By contrast, in cases involving treaties governing relationships between 
sovereign states (particularly dispute settlement), the courts were less willing to 
find that the treaty created a private right or a private right of action. In 
Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, for example, the 
Ninth Circuit considered whether Article 94 of the U.N. Charter—which 
provides that members of the United Nations “undertak[e] to comply with the 
decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a 
party”—endowed U.S. citizens with the ability to bring a lawsuit enjoining the 
American government’s funding of the Contras in Nicaragua.94 The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that it did not: Article 94 did not create a private right of 
action in U.S. courts, because the treaty did not create rights at all. This 
conclusion was grounded in a close reading of Article 94’s text, as well as 
consideration of the U.N. Charter’s purpose.95 
 
Versailles “conferred any private rights with regard to such property which were enforceable in 
American courts”); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (concerning a U.N. 
Security Council resolution: “[W]e find that the provisions here in issue were not addressed to the 
judicial branch of our government. They do not by their terms confer rights upon individual citizens; 
they call upon governments to take certain action.”). 
 89. 988 F.2d at 104. 
 90. In a similar case, Columbia Marine Services, Inc. v. Reffet Ltd., the Second Circuit 
considered a claim brought under a tax treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom that 
exempted English insurers from federal excise taxes on insurance premiums. 861 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 
1988). The Court agreed that the treaty eliminated the tax, but not on the plaintiff in the case: “[T]he 
Treaty was designed expressly to eliminate the tax on insurance premiums paid to foreign insurers” and 
thereby eliminate “double taxation.” Id. at 20-21. 
 91. See Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Greece, Aug. 3, 1951, 5 U.S.T. 1829, 
T.I.A.S. No. 3057. Today these matters are generally addressed through bilateral investment treaties or 
trade agreements, though more than thirty such agreements remain in force between the United States 
and partner countries. 
 92. 988 F.2d at 106. 
 93. Id. 
 94. 859 F.2d 929, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 95. Id. at 937. As in most federal appeals court cases involving treaty claims during the 
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The lower courts also turned a newly skeptical eye on treaties regulating 
the relationship between the state and individuals within the state. In several 
cases, the courts found that human rights treaties were not self-executing, due 
to an express declaration by the United States stating they would not be directly 
enforced.96 Moreover, this critical assessment extended even to a variety of 
treaties that did not contain such express declarations. In In re Iraq and 
Afghanistan Detainees Litigation,97 for example, the D.C. District Court 
considered whether to enforce the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.98 The court concluded that 
“[n]one of the provisions of Geneva Convention IV contain any such express or 
implied language indicating that persons have individual ‘rights’ that may be 
enforced under the treaty.”99 That was true despite the fact that the treaty was 
expressly meant—by its very title, no less—to provide protections for civilian 
persons in time of war. 
Similarly, in Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States,100 the Fourth 
Circuit considered a claim that the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Law 
and Customs of War on Land imposed a duty on the United States to provide 
protection for residents of an occupied territory. The appellants argued that the 
purpose of the Hague Convention was to “codify international law regarding 
the treatment of civilians” and that “[t]he direct beneficiaries of the treaty 
[we]re civilians.”101 Accordingly, the Hague Convention had to be deemed to 
“provid[e] a direct avenue of relief” to aggrieved civilians in U.S. courts, 
because otherwise the United States would enjoy unchecked discretion in 
complying with the directives of the Treaty.102 The court, however, concluded 
that the treaty “does not explicitly provide for a privately enforceable cause of 
action.”103 As a result, it was “not self-executing and, therefore, does not, by 
 
postwar period, the court engaged in a fine-grained and detailed analysis of the treaties at issue. It did 
not invoke a presumption against the treaty’s enforceability that the plaintiff had to overcome. Instead, it 
considered whether a treaty created a private right and was self-executing—and thus produced a private 
right of action—by embarking on a multifactor analysis of the treaty’s text, history, and context. This 
method of analysis was captured by the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law published in 1987. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(4) cmt. h & rep. n.4 (1987). 
 96. Renkel v. United States, 456 F.3d 640, 644 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Renkel argues that the 
Government violated her rights under the Convention . . . . Those Articles [of the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT)] are not, however, expressly self-executing.”); Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 
121, 137 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he ICCPR [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] came 
with attached RUDs [reservations, understandings, and declarations] declaring that the ICCPR is not 
self-executing. This declaration means that the provisions of the ICCPR do not create a private right of 
action or separate form of relief enforceable in United States courts.” (emphasis added)); Saint Fort v. 
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 202 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Saint Fort’s claims do not rest solely on a treaty that is not 
self-executing; they rest on the CAT through the FARRA and the regulations.”). 
 97. 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 115-16 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 98. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53, 
supra note 27. 
 99. 479 F. Supp. 2d at 116. 
 100. 967 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 101. Brief for Appellant at 26, Goldstar (Panama), S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 
1985) (No. 91-2229), 1991 WL 11246241 at *26. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 967 F.2d at 968. 
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itself, create a private right of action for its breach.”104 
2. The Bricker Backlash 
In the post-World War II period, the courts increasingly turned a skeptical 
eye on treaties regulating relations between sovereign states and between states 
and individuals, largely abandoning the presumption in favor of enforcement 
that they had used so routinely in earlier years. At the same time, they 
continued to apply the earlier presumption to treaties involving economic or 
commercial relations and those expressly addressing transnational liability or 
litigation. Why this shift? We argue it can be traced at least in part to changes 
in the nature of the treaties creating individual rights during this period and the 
response to that shift among the political branches and the public. The global 
human rights revolution and the very public backlash against it provoked 
increased scrutiny of treaties that could provide a mechanism by which 
individuals could challenge government policies. This, in turn, led to greater 
wariness among the courts to find that such treaties created private rights of 
action in U.S. courts. 
As we have seen, in the period from the Founding through the mid-
twentieth century, the majority of U.S. treaties that created private rights were 
private law treaties, primarily concerning contract and property rights. In the 
period following World War II, the treaties to which the United States was a 
party and those being litigated in U.S. courts increasingly concerned human 
rights and public law issues. The United States ratified the U.N. Charter in 
1945,105 which included Article 92 establishing the International Court of 
Justice;106 signed the Genocide Convention in 1948;107 ratified the four Geneva 
Conventions by 1955;108 ratified the Vienna Convention in 1963;109 and joined 
many other human rights treaties throughout the Cold War period.110 
Courts were less familiar with these newer treaties and were wary of 
inferring private rights of action to enforce them. Even more important than 
 
 104. Id. at 969. 
 105. U. N. Charter, 59 Stat. 1033, T.S. No. 993 (1945). 
 106. Id. art. 92; Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, T.S. No. 993. In 1946, the U.S. declared that it recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ 
over various matters, see United States Declaration of Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218, 1 U.N.T.S. 9, but it 
withdrew from general ICJ jurisdiction in 1985, following the Nicaragua case, Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). See Letter from 
George P. Shultz, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Dr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General, 
United Nations (Oct. 7, 1985), cited in Medellín v. Texas, 555 U.S. 491, 500 (2008). 
 107. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1, Dec. 9, 
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. The United States did not ratify the Genocide Convention until 
1988. 
 108. E.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 
53, supra note 27. 
 109. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 4. 
 110. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The United States signed 
the ICCPR on October 5, 1977, but did not deposit its instrument of ratification until June 8, 1992. See 
United Nations Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ ParticipationStatus.aspx (last visited 
November 20, 2011). 
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their novelty, however, was the nature of the individual rights they created and 
the political context these new treaties entered. American Bar Association 
President Frank Holman illustrated the irrational fears these treaties provoked 
when he asserted (incorrectly) that if a white person driving through Harlem 
were to accidentally run over a black child, the driver could be extradited to an 
international tribunal or foreign court on charges of genocide.111 Holman’s 
views were extreme but influential. John Foster Dulles was later quoted as 
cautioning against the “trend toward trying to use the treaty-making power to 
effect internal social changes.”112 During the debate over the amendment, Time 
Magazine speculated that “the fight arose” because of concerns similar to 
Dulles’s.113 It cited, in particular, the U.N. Charter, which required that states 
respect rights “without distinction as to race,” and what it said was the 
Genocide Convention’s definition of genocide to include “‘causing . . . mental 
harm’ to members of a ‘national, ethnical, racial or religious group.’”114 
The emergence of human rights treaties during the postwar period thus 
generated a backlash, particularly among those who feared the human rights 
treaties might be used to challenge Jim Crow laws in the South. This backlash 
led to the proposal of what came to be known as the “Bricker Amendment” in 
the 1950s, a series of constitutional amendments proposed in the Senate with 
the goal of effectively reversing the Supremacy Clause—not just for human 
rights treaties but for all treaties. In the end, the Amendment was defeated by a 
single vote.115 
It is often said that judges read the newspapers, and this was no 
exception. Though the Bricker Amendment failed, the courts got the message. 
The controversy surrounding the debate over international law and the new and 
growing body of treaty law—including human rights treaties—underscored the 
political backlash in the United States against treaties that could lead to 
challenges to domestic laws, norms and institutions through private lawsuits. 
Courts thus began scrutinizing such claims with greater caution—and growing 
skepticism. This initial shift in the courts’ approach was later codified in the 
Second and Third Restatements of Foreign Relations Law in 1965 and 1987. 
The Second Restatement did not expressly address private rights of action, but 
stated that a treaty “has immediate domestic effect as the supreme law of the 
land . . . only if it is self-executing.”116 The Third Restatement went further and 
 
 111. DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF 
EISENHOWER’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 13 (1988). 
 112. The Bricker Amendment: A Cure Worse than the Disease?, TIME, July 13, 1953, at 20. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 21. Several prominent black intellectuals and leaders also saw the promise of human 
rights agreements for advancing the civil rights struggle in the United States. CAROL ANDERSON, EYES 
OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
1944-1955 (2003); WE CHARGE GENOCIDE: THE HISTORIC PETITION TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR 
RELIEF FROM A CRIME OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE NEGRO PEOPLE (William 
L. Patterson ed., 1951). 
 115. See Hathaway, Treaties’ End, supra note 14, at 1303. 
 116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 141 cmt. a (1965). David Sloss 
implies that after the publication of section 141 in the Second Restatement, courts were also more likely 
to find that treaties were not self-executing. According to Sloss, the Second Restatement provided 
doctrinal support for the notion that “treaty makers have an affirmative power to decide that a ratified 
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provided that “[i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefiting private 
persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of 
action in domestic courts, but there are exceptions with respect to both rights 
and remedies.”117 These Restatements reflected—and, indeed, encouraged—a 
growing tendency in the federal courts to insist on express evidence in the 
treaty or its legislative history that it was intended to be enforceable in 
domestic courts. 
Still, even in the years leading up to Medellín, the federal courts’ growing 
reluctance to employ a presumption in favor of private rights of action had not 
resulted in a consistent and uniform presumption against them. Rather, the 
lower courts generally looked to the text and the history of the ratification 
process to determine whether a treaty was meant to be self-executing, to give 
rise to a private right, or to create a private right of action. Moreover, lower 
courts tended to maintain the presumption in favor of private rights of action 
for bilateral treaties and for treaties protecting private, common law rights.118 It 
was these last two threads of the earlier framework that Medellín would cut. 
C. After Medellín 
Although it had long been assumed that the treaties granting jurisdiction 
to the ICJ constituted binding federal law in the United States, the Supreme 
Court held in Medellín that they were non-self-executing. Thus, Medellín could 
not rely on them to enforce the Avena judgment requiring review and 
reconsideration of his sentence. In the course of its decision, the Supreme Court 
endorsed what it characterized as a “background presumption” against finding 
that treaties confer private causes of action.119 In what has become influential 
dicta, the Court stated, “Even when treaties are self-executing in the sense that 
they create federal law, the background presumption is that international 
agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not 
create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic 
courts.”120 This statement by the Medellín Court appears to suggest that the 
presumption against finding a private right of action had previously been 
universally applied, which, as we have seen, is not the case. 
Despite its inaccuracy and status as dicta, the blanket statement by the 
Medellín Court has led to a significant shift in U.S. courts’ approach to Article 
II treaties. No longer is the presumption against private rights of action applied 
 
treaty will not be converted into primary domestic law, even though there are no constitutional 
impediments to automatic conversion.” David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a 
Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 15 (2002). Sloss argues the “Constitution does not 
give the treaty makers a power to shape primary domestic law directly” and the Restatement doctrine is 
therefore flawed because “it is founded upon an erroneous assumption about the treaty makers’ 
constitutional powers.” Id.; see also David Sloss, Schizophrenic Treaty Law, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 15, 
19 (2007) (describing the differences between “transnationalist” and “nationalist” canons of 
interpretation in determining whether treaties are self-executing). 
 117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 907 cmt. a (1987). 
 118. See supra note 85. 
 119. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008). 
 120. Id. (citations omitted). 
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exclusively to public law treaties. Instead, as we shall show, lower courts are 
treating it as universal. After Medellín, the courts have begun applying the 
opposite presumption of that used by the courts during most of the country’s 
history. Instead of presuming that treaties that create private rights necessarily 
create private rights of action, courts now generally presume that they do not, 
regardless of the type of treaty. 
This will likely come as a surprise to many. Immediately after Medellín 
was decided by the Supreme Court, the leading scholars in the field mused that 
the decision did not support a strong presumption against finding private rights 
of action in treaties and that it would not significantly change the interpretation 
of treaties previously understood to be self-executing.121 In 2009, the American 
Bar Association and the American Society of International Law adopted a joint 
task force report that concluded that Medellín’s “self-execution analysis may 
affect a limited class of treaties or a very substantial number,” and it was too 
early to tell.122 Today, almost four years after Medellín, it appears that the more 
dire predictions have come true. It is now abundantly clear that Medellín has 
begun to make a difference in the interpretation of treaties in two key respects 
that we detail below. For those who regard the legal enforceability of Article II 
treaties as in the country’s best interests,123 these trends in treaty interpretation 
resulting from Medellín should be deeply troubling. 
1. A Presumption Against Private Rights of Action 
Medellín has changed the nature of U.S. courts’ treaty analysis, leading 
them increasingly to adopt a strong presumption that treaties are neither self-
executing nor protective of private rights, and thus do not give rise to private 
rights of action. This shift is evident in the lower federal courts’ decisions in 
the nearly four years since the Supreme Court’s decision. 
Consider, for example, the Second and Eleventh Circuits’ decisions in 
Mora v. New York124 and Gandara v. Bennett.125 Both Mora and Gandara 
concerned whether plaintiffs could be awarded damages under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 for state officials’ violations of their rights under the Vienna Convention. 
The plaintiffs in each case claimed that after being arrested for various criminal 
offenses in New York and Georgia, respectively, state law enforcement 
officials had failed to inform them of their rights to consular notification and 
access under the Vienna Convention and as a result, the plaintiffs had 
inadequate counsel and were sentenced to unfair periods of incarceration. 
 
 121. E.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 540, 540-41 (2008) (“[S]ome commentators may claim that the decision supports a strong 
presumption against self-execution, and that as a result many treaties that would formerly have been 
treated as self-executing will now be treated as non-self-executing. A careful reading of the decision 
suggests that this is not a fair construction.”). 
 122. AM. BAR ASS’N & AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW JOINT TASK FORCE ON TREATIES IN U.S. 
LAWS, REPORT 2 (2009) [hereinafter ABA/ASIL Report], available at http://www.asil.org/files/ 
TreatiesTaskForceReport.pdf. 
 123. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text. 
 124. 524 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 125. 528 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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Neither plaintiff sought to sue under the Vienna Convention directly. They 
instead claimed that section 1983 provided them with a private right of action 
for the treaty violation. 
Both the Mora and Gandara Courts refused to let the cases proceed, 
holding that even if section 1983 supplied a private cause of action, the Vienna 
Convention did not give rise to private rights in the first place. In Mora, the 
Second Circuit oriented its analysis entirely around the principles articulated in 
dicta in Medellín’s footnote three. The court explained that “international 
agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not 
create private rights”126 and that “‘treaties do not create privately enforceable 
rights in the absence of express language to the contrary.’”127 Therefore, the 
court could not enforce the treaty-based claim.128 The Gandara panel, like the 
Mora court, oriented its majority opinion around “the general rule . . . that 
‘[i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, 
generally do not create private rights,’” although it cited to the Restatement 
rather than to Medellín for this point.129  
In another recent case, Toor v. Holder,130 the D.C. District Court similarly 
extended the Medellín dicta’s presumption against inferring private rights of 
action to the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced 
Persons.131 A Canadian citizen serving a sentence in U.S. federal prison 
brought suit against the Attorney General, claiming that the U.S. Department of 
Justice had prevented him from applying to transfer to a Canadian prison as he 
was authorized to do under the Convention. The district court resolved the case 
in one fell swoop by adopting a presumption against private rights and private 
rights of action. It stated that “‘[i]nternational agreements . . . generally do not 
create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic 
courts,’”132 and concluded that “[s]ince the Convention has no express 
language to rebut a presumption against a private right of action, plaintiff lacks 
standing to sue under the treaty or its implementing statute.”133 The new 
Medellín-inspired presumption against private rights of action thus appears to 
have been decisive. 
 
 126. Mora, 524 F.3d at 200 (quoting Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008)). 
 127. Id. at 201 (quoting Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506 n.3). 
 128. Two years later, relying on its decision in Mora and the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Medellín, the Second Circuit quickly concluded that, as a matter of first impression, the International 
Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs) did not give rise to a private right of action. Katel Ltd. Liability 
Co. v. AT&T Corp., 607 F.3d 60, 67-68 (2d Cir. 2010). The ITRs “have treaty status” and were 
promulgated by a United Nations agency responsible for international communications issues in order to 
provide for the settlement of disputes by member states of the agency. The United States is one of the 
191 member states of the agency. Id. at 67. While the ITRs do not protect private rights, the Second 
Circuit’s decision is noteworthy in that it reiterated the rule that treaties do not create a private right of 
action absent express language to the contrary. 
 129. Gandara, 528 F.3d at 828 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 
907 cmt. a (1987), as quoted in Cornejo v. San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 130. 717 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 131. Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 1983, 35 
U.S.T. 2867, T.I.A.S. No. 10,824. 
 132. Toor, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 107 (citing Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008)). 
 133. Id. 
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2. An End to the Carve-Out for Private Law 
Medellín has also led lower courts to apply the presumption against 
enforcement universally, apparently eliminating the carve-out for private law 
treaties that persisted through the postwar period up until Medellín. This can be 
seen in particular in several cases decided by the D.C. and Third Circuits 
between 2008 and 2010. 
McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran is particularly instructive 
because it spans the period before and after Medellín and thus offers an unusual 
opportunity to witness the impact of the decision on lower courts’ decision 
making.134 A group of U.S. corporations, collectively called “McKesson,” and 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a federal agency that 
helps American businesses invest abroad, brought a complaint against Iran in 
the district court of Washington, D.C. They alleged that Iran had illegally 
expropriated McKesson’s interest in an Iranian dairy company following the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979, and that this nationalization violated McKesson’s 
rights under the U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity,135 which provided that “[p]roperty 
of nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party” shall “receive the 
most constant protection and security within the territories of the other High 
Contracting Party” and that such property shall not be “taken without the 
prompt payment of just compensation.”136 
In 2001, the D.C. Circuit held that the Treaty of Amity created a private 
right of action for American corporations in U.S. courts. It concluded that 
“[t]he Treaty of Amity . . . explicitly creates property rights for foreign 
nationals” of both countries, and therefore it “contemplates judicial 
enforcement of those rights” in both American and Iranian courts.”137 Having 
found private rights, it inferred a private right of action to enforce those rights, 
thereby reflecting the common approach to bilateral treaties—particularly 
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties—prior to Medellín.138 
On a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, however, the 
newly elected Bush Administration argued that the entire action should be 
dismissed, because the Treaty of Amity did not confer a private right of action 
on McKesson Corporation.139 The Supreme Court rejected the petition for 
 
 134. 539 F.3d 485 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 135. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and 
Iran art. IV, cl. 2, Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899, 903, 284 U.N.T.S. 93. 
 136. Id. art. IV. 
 137. McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F.3d 1101, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir. 
2001). 
 138. Recall that even as courts in the post-World War II period were increasingly reluctant to 
find private rights of action in treaties, see supra Section I.B, they had continued to presume that private 
rights created in bilateral treaties, particularly in “Friendship, Commerce and Navigation” treaties, were 
enforceable. See, e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508 (1947) (holding that the Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Consular Rights between the United States and Germany was enforceable in U.S. 
court). The Court may also have been persuaded by the fact that the United States “actively supported 
McKesson’s right to assert its expropriation claim against Iran” in the U.S. court system. Brief for 
Appellees at 26, McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.3d 485 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-
7113). 
 139. McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.3d 485, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
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certiorari, but the D.C. Circuit directed the district court to reconsider the case 
in light of the government’s position.140 The district court rejected the 
argument, Iran appealed, and the suit landed before the D.C. Circuit again in 
2008. The sole question at issue was whether the Treaty of Amity created a 
private right of action that would allow enforcement of the treaty by a private 
party in U.S. courts. 
While the case was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in 
Medellín. The D.C. Circuit subsequently abandoned its 2001 position and, 
drawing heavily from Medellín, reversed its earlier position. It concluded that 
the Treaty of Amity did not create a private right of action for any party as a 
matter of U.S. law.141 Although the panel acknowledged that the “Treaty of 
Amity, like other treaties of its kind, is self-executing,”142 it held that according 
to the dicta in Medellín’s footnote three, “‘the background presumption is that 
[i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, 
generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in 
domestic courts.’”143 The D.C. Circuit “[found] nothing in the Treaty of Amity 
that overcomes this presumption.” While the Treaty of Amity did “benefit[] 
McKesson,” in establishing that monetary compensation should be provided to 
parties like McKesson if its property was taken,144 the treaty did not specify 
how compensation should be provided.145 In other words, the treaty created a 
right but not a remedy, and its “silence on this [latter] point makes all the 
difference.”146 
The D.C. Circuit’s reluctance to infer a private right of action in the 
Treaty of Amity with Iran, despite its 2001 decision to the contrary, suggests 
that Medellín is, indeed, changing judicial practice. The McKesson Court 
explained that its decision was consistent with “traditional assumptions about 
how treaties operate.”147 That claim, however, was misleading: the McKesson 
decision was not consistent with “traditional assumptions” about such treaties 
nor even with earlier assumptions about the particular treaty in the case. Given 
that the United States is currently a party to Friendship, Commerce, and 
Navigation treaties with dozens of states,148 an extension of the McKesson line 
 
(recounting the procedural history of the case). 
 140. McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 320 F.3d 280, 281 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(instructing the district court “to reexamine [the private right of action] issue in light of the 
representation of the United States that it does not interpret the Treaty of Amity to create such a cause of 
action”). 
 141. McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.3d 485 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 142. Id. at 489. 
 143. Id. (quoting Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. Although the court cited Medellín for the presumption against treaties creating private 
rights of action, the case most relevant to its decision was Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping 
Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442 (1988) (holding that a treaty that “only set[s] forth substantive rules of conduct 
and state[s] that compensation shall be paid for certain wrongs . . . do[es] not create private rights of 
action for foreign corporations to recover compensation from foreign states in United States courts” 
(citations omitted)). 
 147. McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.3d 485, 491 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 148. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2011 (2011), available 
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of reasoning to those long-standing bilateral treaties is likely to make a material 
difference to the status of international law in U.S. courts.149 
Medellín’s presumption against private rights of action has spread to 
agreements that expressly create private rights. In Gross v. German Foundation 
Industrial Initiative,150 the Third Circuit declined to find a private right of 
action in an executive agreement exclusively concerned with private law rights. 
Under the agreement between the United States and Germany, the United 
States agreed to shield German firms from Nazi-era litigation in U.S. courts and 
to quash sixty pending Holocaust cases. In exchange, the German Industrial 
Initiative would make available five billion deutsche marks for victims of 
corporate wrongdoing during the Nazi reign. Under the agreement, the majority 
of pending Holocaust-related cases were dismissed. Nevertheless, the Initiative 
had trouble raising funds and took eighteen months to meet its obligation of 
paying out the promised money to Holocaust victims. In 2007, the victim-
beneficiaries therefore brought suit in federal court, seeking interest payments 
from the Initiative in the form of damages for breach of contract. The Third 
Circuit dismissed the suit, holding that the Joint Statement evinced a “strong 
intent” on the part of the signatories not to create private rights of action.151 
This proposition, the Third Circuit held, found support in Medellín’s footnote 
three, and its “background presumption . . . that [i]nternational agreements, 
even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private 
rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts.”152 
The Third Circuit’s extension of the Medellín presumption to the Joint 
Statement in Gross is notable because it runs directly against the long tradition 
in U.S. courts of presuming that treaties that concern private, common-law type 
rights—such as property, inheritance, and contract rights—also create private 
causes of action. As discussed in Section II.A, the Supreme Court routinely 
assumed that treaties of such a nature were enforceable in U.S. courts from the 
Founding through World War II.153 In the years leading up to Medellín, lower 
federal courts maintained that posture.154 For instance, courts continued to infer 
that treaties like the Convention on the International Sale of Goods, which 
 
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/169274.pdf (listing all of the FCN treaties currently in 
force between the United States and other countries, by country). 
 149. The United States is also a party to Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with 40 countries. 
See Bilateral Investment Treaties, TRADE COMPLIANCE CENTER, http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_ 
Agreements/Bilateral_Investment_Treaties/index.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2011). Nonetheless, because 
BITs typically provide for the arbitration of disputes before bodies such as the International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Medellín will have less bearing on the enforcement of BITs. 
Even Medellín itself noted that its holding was unlikely to affect BITs, given that the United States had 
passed implementing legislation which gives decisions by the ICSID tribunal the status of “final 
judgments.” Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521 (2008). Interestingly, McKesson is still being litigated 
in the D.C. Circuit, but now under Iranian law. Under Iran’s legal regime, “treaties have the force of 
law.” Accordingly, all parties conceded in 2009 that McKesson Corporation had a cause of action under 
the Treaty of Amity as a matter of Iranian law. McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 752 F. 
Supp. 2d 12, 17 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 150. 549 F.3d 605 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 151. Id. at 612. 
 152. Id. at 615 (quoting Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506 n.3) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 153. See supra Section I.A. 
 154. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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governs contracts for the sale of goods between private entities in different 
countries, generated private rights of action.155 If Gross signifies a new way 
forward and an extension of Medellín’s presumption to treaties concerning 
private entities and their common law rights, it could raise questions about the 
enforceability of numerous treaties to which the United States is a party.156 
Medellín has already led to changes in courts’ approaches to direct 
enforcement of international law in at least four circuits. The recent decisions 
by the D.C. Circuit and the Third Circuit are the most significant, because they 
demonstrate an extension of Medellín’s presumption against private rights of 
action for treaties that were previously understood to be self-executing. If this 
trend continues—and is not addressed by the Supreme Court—it will likely be 
substantially more difficult for private parties to directly enforce Article II 
treaty obligations in U.S. courts through a private right of action. 
III.  HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW COMES HOME 
Many will read our findings on the trend in the case law after Medellín as 
sounding a death knell for the enforcement of Article II treaties in U.S. courts. 
After all, it is commonly assumed that if an international treaty cannot be used 
as a source of a private right of action, then it cannot be enforced in a U.S. 
court at all. That common assumption, however, misses a significant part of the 
picture of international law enforcement in U.S. courts. In fact, treaties are 
regularly enforced in U.S. courts even when there is no private right of action. 
Understanding this bigger picture is essential to understanding the true impact 
of the courts’ shifting position on the enforcement of treaties through private 
rights of action. 
International treaties are enforced by courts in three circumstances in 
which the treaty itself does not give rise to a private right of action. First, 
treaties may create a right that can then be enforced through legislation that 
makes the right actionable. We call this “indirect enforcement.” Second, a 
treaty may be invoked defensively by a private party who has been prosecuted 
or sued under a statute that is inconsistent with a treaty provision. We call this 
“defensive enforcement.” Third, courts may look to treaties when interpreting 
statutes and, more controversially, constitutional provisions. We call this 
“interpretive enforcement.” We refrain from engaging in evaluative 
comparisons among these methods because the enforcement of treaties through 
indirect, defensive, or interpretive means is not an interchangeable choice. 
Rather, whether a given method of treaty enforcement will be available to a 
litigant or to a judge will depend on the particular treaty at issue and the context 
 
 155. E.g., BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petoleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 
2003) (holding that the Convention on the International Sale of Goods gives rise to private rights of 
action). 
 156. Cf. ABA/ASIL Report, supra note 122, at 8 (noting that “there have been quite a few other 
provisions in treaties affecting private commercial law that [historically have been] enforced without the 
need for implementing legislation,” such as the Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation 
for Foreign Public Documents, Oct. 5, 1961, 527 U.N.T.S. 198; the Protocol on Powers of Attorney 
Which Are To Be Utilized Abroad, Feb. 17, 1940, 56 Stat. 1376, 161 U.N.T.S. 229; and the Protocol on 
Juridical Personality of Foreign Companies, June 25, 1936, 55 Stat. 1201, 161 U.N.T.S. 217). 
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in which an individual’s claim has arisen. We therefore examine each of these 
methods below in depth, in order to provide a comprehensive, unified 
discussion of U.S. treaty enforcement that has until now been missing. 
A. Indirect Enforcement 
Even when a treaty does not provide a private right of action, private 
rights of litigants in the treaty can often be enforced indirectly through various 
statutory vehicles. The most common and obvious of these statutory vehicles is 
implementing legislation enacted precisely to give force and effect to a 
particular treaty obligation. Less well known is the enforcement of treaties 
through section 1983 and habeas corpus proceedings.157 We discuss each of 
these in brief. 
1. Implementing Legislation 
Congress has the authority to implement treaties through legislation.158 In 
so doing, it may also choose to create private rights of action that allow 
individual plaintiffs to sue to enforce international legal obligations. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has asserted that “a decision to create a private right of action is 
one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of cases.”159 
Several treaties are currently enforced through implementing legislation 
that includes private rights of action. Consider, for example, the U.N. 
Convention Against Torture,160 which is enforced in part through the Torture 
Victim Protection Act’s establishment of civil liability for individuals who 
commit torture;161 the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction,162 
which was implemented through the International Child Abduction Remedies 
Act providing for a cause of action for individuals seeking to assert their 
parental rights in court;163 and the Chemical Weapons Convention 
 
 157. The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006), might be thought to be 
another mechanism for indirect enforcement of a treaty. However, treaty obligations—both self-
executing and non-self-executing—are relevant in ATCA litigation only to the extent that they provide 
evidence of a customary international law norm. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718, 734-
36, (2004). In such cases it is the customary norm, not the treaty obligation per se, that the courts 
enforce. 
 158. Indeed, there continues to be a debate as to whether Congress has a duty to implement 
treaties that have passed through advice and consent proceedings or whether Congress may pursue its 
own independent evaluation before approving appropriations and other implementing measures. See 
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 204-06 (2d ed. 1996). The 
Supreme Court has held that Congress may act beyond the scope of its enumerated powers in Article I 
when passing legislation that is “necessary and proper” to enforce a treaty. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 
U.S. 416, 432-35 (1920). 
 159. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727. 
 160. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 161. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (“An 
individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation . . . subjects an 
individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual . . . .”). 
 162. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. 
No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89. 
 163. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) (2006). 
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Implementation Act of 1998,164 which, as its title makes clear, implements the 
U.S. obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. These are only a 
few examples of the many treaties that are enforced in U.S. courts pursuant to 
implementing legislation passed for this express purpose. 
2. Section 1983 
In recent years, plaintiffs have sought to recover damages under section 
1983165 for violations of their right to consular notification under Article 36 of 
the Vienna Convention.166 Rather than require that the treaty be self-executing 
and expressly give rise to a private right of action—as courts have increasingly 
required for direct enforcement of treaties since Medellin—courts considering 
indirect enforcement through section 1983 have required that the treaty be self-
executing and confer private rights. When a treaty satisfies these two 
requirements, the private right supplied by the treaty has been treated as 
presumptively enforceable under section 1983. In other words, section 1983 
serves as a statutory mechanism that supplies the relevant cause of action. 
To date, several circuit courts have considered whether a foreign national 
who is not informed of his right to consular notification under Article 36 of the 
Vienna Convention may bring a private right of action for damages under 
section 1983. The Seventh Circuit is the only court to hold that a treaty, in this 
case the Convention, meets both requirements in the absence of implementing 
legislation. In Jogi v. Voges,167 the Seventh Circuit decided that an individual 
may sue for damages under section 1983 when he or she is not informed of his 
right to consular notification. The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by 
concluding that the phrase “and laws” in section 1983 should be read to include 
treaties.168 It noted that “[o]nly a small subset of treaties . . . would even be 
candidates for such a lawsuit.”169 An individual seeking to proceed under 
section 1983 for a violation of his rights under a treaty must show two things: 
(1) that a personal right can be inferred from the treaty, in this case from Article 
 
 164. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 
Stat. 2681 (1998). 
 165. In relevant part, section 1983 provides that  
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress.  
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 166. Subsection I.A.2 focuses exclusively on circuit court decisions that have considered that 
question. 
 167. 480 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 168. Id. at 826-27. The Seventh Circuit decided to withdraw its earlier opinion in this case, Jogi 
v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2005), and substitute it with the one described here. The court noted 
that since the first opinion was decided, the Supreme Court had spoken on the subject of the Vienna 
Convention in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006), and had addressed the relationship 
between the exclusionary rule and section 1983. Based on these developments, the court decided to re-
issue the opinion on narrower grounds. See Jogi, 480 F.3d at 824. 
 169. 480 F.3d at 827. 
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36 of the Convention, and (2) that he is entitled to a private remedy.170 The 
court concluded that although most parts of the Convention address only state-
to-state relations, language in the treaty providing that authorities “shall inform 
the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph”171 
unambiguously refers to the existence of individual rights. Noting that the 
Supreme Court had held that “[o]nce a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute 
confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983,” 
the Seventh Circuit concluded that Jogi was entitled to pursue his claim under 
section 1983.172 
At the moment, the Seventh Circuit stands alone. The Second, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have each concluded that a foreign national may not bring an 
action for damages under section 1983 based on a state’s alleged breach of the 
Vienna Convention,173 and the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held that the 
Convention does not create judicially enforceable rights at all.174 The Eleventh 
and Ninth Circuits in Gandara and Cornejo, respectively, agreed with the 
Seventh Circuit that the Convention is a self-executing treaty, in that it “has the 
force of domestic law without the need for implementing legislation by 
Congress.”175 However, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that for “any treaty to be 
susceptible to judicial enforcement it must both confer individual rights and be 
self-executing.”176 Article 36, in its view, does not confer private rights. In 
Mora,177 the Second Circuit—drawing on Medellín and representations by the 
Executive Branch—similarly concluded that the rights outlined in the 
Convention belonged to state parties and not private individuals.178 
Even though the Seventh Circuit stands alone in holding that actions for 
damages under the Vienna Convention specifically can be brought through the 
section 1983 vehicle, the reasoning of the other circuits in the Vienna 
Convention cases shows that for treaties aside from the Vienna Convention, 
section 1983 could prove a more fruitful instrument for enforcing treaty 
obligations. The Ninth and Second Circuits, in Cornejo and Mora respectively, 
both agreed with the Seventh Circuit that whether a treaty confers a private 
right is a distinct question from whether it entitles an individual to a specific 
remedy—for example, a private right of action. As long as a treaty meets the 
first test, it need not meet the second in order for a private party to raise a 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 833 (citing Article 36 of the Vienna Convention). 
 172. Id. at 835 (citing Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002)). 
 173. E.g., Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2008); Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183 
(2d Cir. 2008); Cornejo v. Cnty. of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 174. The Fifth and Sixth Circuit precedents on the matter involved criminal proceedings. 
United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 391-92 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 
243 F.3d 192, 197-98 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 175. Gandara, 528 F.3d at 828; Cornejo, 504 F.3d at 856 (“There is no question that the Vienna 
Convention is self-executing. As such, it has the force of domestic law without the need for 
implementing legislation by Congress.”). 
 176. Gandara, 528 F.3d. at 828 (quoting Cornejo, 504 F.3d at 856) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 177. 524 F.3d at 193 n.16. 
 178. Id. at 188, 194. 
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treaty-based claim in a section 1983 lawsuit. In Cornejo, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the Vienna Convention did not confer private rights at all, and 
so section 1983 could not provide a relevant cause of action.179 In Mora, the 
Second Circuit held that if a plaintiff had been shown to enjoy an individual 
right under the Vienna Convention, his claim for “damages pursuant to § 1983 
would likely be actionable.”180 
In sum, there appears to be widespread agreement among the circuits that 
where a treaty protects private rights, section 1983 provides a private right of 
action that can be sometimes be used to enforce those rights in court. 
3. Habeas Corpus 
The federal habeas statute provides that habeas relief is available for 
violations of a treaty. It provides that writs of habeas corpus may be granted to 
a prisoner who “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties 
of the United States.”181 While the majority of modern day habeas petitioners 
alleging treaty violations have been unsuccessful, courts have demonstrated a 
willingness to consider the merits of claims regarding treaty violations in 
habeas petitions.182 
Since habeas corpus constitutes a separate statutory mechanism for treaty 
enforcement, the analysis is similar to that in the section 1983 context. Thus 
far, the courts that have addressed the issue have required that the treaty be 
self-executing in order to serve as a basis for habeas relief,183 and they have 
 
 179. 504 F.3d at 858-59. 
 180. 524 F.3d at 199 n.23. 
 181. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006). Most federal prisoners file habeas petitions under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 after they have exhausted their direct appeals. If the remedy provided by section 2255 is 
“inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [a prisoner’s] detention,” prisoners may petition for 
traditional writs of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. § 2255(c). Section 2241, unlike 
section 2255, expressly includes violation of “treaties of the United States” as a basis for challenging 
custody. Id. § 2241(c)(3). However, “the grounds for relief under § 2255 are the equivalent of those 
under general federal habeas corpus statutes that refer to ‘the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 
United States.’” Bannerman v. Snyder, 325 F.3d 722, 724 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Davis v. United 
States, 417 U.S. 333, 344 (1974)). Thus, this Section assumes that treaty violations can be alleged under 
either § 2241 or § 2255. 
 182. The Supreme Court has limited the availability of relief for treaty violations through its 
application of state default rules. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (applying 
procedural bar rule to claims asserted by habeas petitioner even though doing so would prevent 
compliance with the decision of the ICJ); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam) (applying 
Virginia’s procedural default doctrine to a Vienna Convention claim on habeas review). Moreover, the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) limits a federal court’s review of a 
state court’s decision regarding a habeas petition. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections in 28 U.S.C.). For a writ to issue under the AEDPA, a federal court must 
find that the state court’s decision was either contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of 
“clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(1) (2006). 
 183. See, e.g., Bannerman, 325 F.3d at 724 (reasoning that “the reference to ‘treaties of the 
United States’s in § 2241 cannot be construed as an implementation of non-self-executing provisions of 
treaties so as to render them judicially enforceable under § 2241 when they are not enforceable under § 
2255”); Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Unless a treaty is self-executing . . . it 
does not, in and of itself, create individual rights that can give rise to habeas relief.”). Often, however, 
the court will find that implementing legislation makes it unnecessary to decide whether the treaty, on its 
own, could be enforced via habeas. See, e.g., Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 218 n.22 (3d Cir. 
2003) (“We similarly find it unnecessary to consider the proposition that habeas corpus claims may be 
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rejected petitions in cases where the treaties relied upon by petitioners are non-
self-executing.184 If, however, the treaty is self-executing and confers private 
rights, the habeas corpus statutory provisions confer the relevant private right 
of action, even if the treaty itself does not.185 Although most courts have not 
focused explicitly on private rights or private rights of action in the habeas 
context, there is support for the proposition that a habeas petition obviates the 
need for an independent treaty-specific private right of action.186 
Courts have, for example, allowed petitioners to allege violations of 
extradition treaties in habeas petitions. In the case discussed earlier, United 
States v. Rauscher,187 the Supreme Court established the principle, now known 
as the rule of specialty, that an extradited defendant has an individually 
enforceable right not to be prosecuted for any offense other than that for which 
the surrendering country agreed to extradite.188 Thus, an individual may seek 
relief under an extradition treaty in one of two ways. First, a defendant may 
invoke the extradition treaty defensively in criminal proceedings against him, 
as did the defendant in Rauscher.189 Second, provided that all other remedies 
have been exhausted and that there are no procedural bars, a prisoner may file a 
habeas petition alleging that his detention or sentence violates the terms of the 
relevant extradition treaty. This is not a mere theoretical possibility. Petitioners 
have indeed used the habeas petition to argue that their convictions violated 
extradition treaties in cases involving the rule of specialty announced in 
Rauscher,190 forcible kidnapping,191 and the imposition of a life sentence.192 
Although most such claims have been unsuccessful, courts have accepted 
that petitioners may use a habeas petition to enforce their rights under an 
extradition treaty. In Benitez v. Garcia, for instance, a Ninth Circuit panel held 
that a sentence violated the terms of an extradition treaty and granted the 
petitioner’s habeas request.193 Benitez, a Mexican citizen who had fled to 
Venezuela, was extradited to the United States pursuant to an extradition treaty 
with Venezuela and sentenced to fifteen years to life for murder by a California 
trial court. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his sentence 
violated an extradition decree from the Supreme Court of Venezuela when it 
 
based on violations of treaties regardless whether the treaty is non-self-executing or self-executing.”). 
 184. See, e.g., Wesson v. U.S. Penitentiary Beaumont, 305 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a 
claim brought pursuant to the ICCPR); Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a claim 
brought pursuant to the Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights). 
 185. Stephen Vladeck has argued that “after St. Cyr, courts are on far shakier ground in barring 
the use of habeas to litigate claims under non-self-executing treaties.” Stephen I. Vladeck, Non-Self-
Executing Treaties and the Suspension Clause After St. Cyr, 113 YALE L. J. 2007, 2008 (2004). 
 186. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing Wang, 320 F.3d at 
140-41 & n.16) (“The availability of habeas may obviate a petitioner’s need to rely on a private right of 
action . . . .”). 
 187. 119 U.S. 407, 419 (1886) (“[C]ourts are bound to take judicial notice of, and to enforce in 
any appropriate proceeding the rights of persons growing out of [the extradition] treaty . . . .”). See supra 
text accompanying notes 62-66. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Section II.B, infra, for a discussion of the defensive use of treaties. 
 190. E.g., Gallo-Chamorro v. United States, 233 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 191. E.g., Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 492 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 192. E.g., Benitez v. Garcia, 495 F.3d 640, 641 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 193. Benitez v. Garcia, 449 F.3d 971, 972 (9th Cir. 2006), superseded by 495 F.3d at 640. 
51_HATHAWAY, MCELROY, SOLOW_INT'L LAW AT HOME.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/3/12 5:51 PM 
82 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 37: 1 
 
had approved the extradition. That decree stated that Benitez could not receive 
the death penalty or be sentenced to more than thirty years if convicted.194 In 
2006, the Ninth Circuit granted Benitez’s habeas petition, finding that the 
extradition treaty was clearly established federal law and that it limited the 
punishment that Benitez could receive to that specified as part of his extradition 
under the treaty.195 A year later, however, the court withdrew the opinion and 
substituted it with one denying the petition.196 In this subsequent opinion, it 
reasoned that because the decree of the Venezuelan Supreme Court was 
unilaterally imposed and not negotiated, Benitez’s sentence did not violate the 
extradition treaty.197 
Beyond extradition treaties, federal courts have allowed plaintiffs to use 
habeas corpus to bring suits based on violations of other treaties. For instance, 
the Seventh Circuit vacated a district court’s dismissal of a habeas petition 
alleging a violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention in Osagiede v. 
United States.198 Osagiede, a Nigerian alien, was arrested for heroin 
distribution and was not informed of his right to contact his consulate under 
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. At trial, he was convicted. Subsequently, 
Osagiede filed a pro se habeas motion to vacate his sentence on the grounds 
that his counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a remedy at trial for the 
Article 36 violation. The Seventh Circuit held that Osagiede was entitled “to an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether he [was] prejudiced by the failure to 
invoke the Convention.”199 In support of its holding, the court stated that, 
contrary to the government’s claim, “a reasonable Illinois lawyer would have 
known that this Court has never held that Article 36 did not create individual 
rights; instead, we have always assumed that it did.”200 Because a reasonable 
lawyer would have argued that the Vienna Convention was self-executing and 
that it conferred private rights on individuals, the Court held that the petitioner 
should be able to use habeas to make a Vienna Convention-based claim.201 
Plaintiffs have also sought to use habeas petitions to allege that their 
rights under the Geneva Conventions were violated when they were held as 
enemy combatants.202 It remains unsettled whether this sort of action is 
possible. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s 
 
 194. Id. at 973. 
 195. Id. at 977-78. The case was governed by the standards set forth under the AEDPA. Id. at 
974. For a discussion of the AEDPA, see supra note 182. 
 196. The court offered no explanation for the substitution in its per curiam opinion. Benitez, 495 
F.3d at 641. 
 197. Id. at 644. 
 198. 543 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2008). Unlike Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), Osagiede 
did not involve the application of state procedural default rules or an attempt to enforce a judgment of 
the ICJ. 
 199. Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 412-13. 
 200. Id. at 409-10. 
 201. The court noted its earlier decision in Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2007). For a 
discussion of Jogi, see supra Subsection II.A.2. In Jogi, the Seventh Circuit held that section 1983 
provided the relevant private right of action. 480 F.3d at 836. In Osagiede, the court appears to have 
assumed that the habeas petition served the same function. 543 F.3d at 410. 
 202. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004). 
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attempt to bring a Geneva Conventions claim via habeas petition, concluding 
that the treaty was not self-executing.203 In Hamdan, the D.C. Circuit similarly 
declined to directly enforce the Geneva Conventions.204 The Supreme Court 
reversed, ruling in favor of the plaintiff on the merits and finding that the 
President had violated Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.205 It found it 
unnecessary, however, to decide whether the Geneva Conventions were self-
executing in order to reach that holding.206  
Enforcement of the Geneva Conventions through habeas appeared to have 
been obviated for some time by section 5 of the Military Commissions Act of 
2006 (MCA),207 which provided that “[n]o person may invoke the Geneva 
Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action 
or proceeding . . . as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its 
States or territories.”208 The constitutionality of this provision remains a topic 
of ongoing dispute.209 However, the Military Commissions Act of 2009210 
amended this provision to state that “[n]o alien unprivileged enemy belligerent 
subject to trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the 
Geneva Conventions as a basis for a private right of action.”211 Under the 
amended law, enforcement of the Conventions through habeas remains a 
possibility, because the habeas corpus statutory provisions can provide the 
relevant private right of action. 
B. Defensive Enforcement 
Up until this point, we have been discussing offensive enforcement of 
treaties by private individuals. As we have shown, section 1983 and the habeas 
 
 203. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468-69 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
The Supreme Court did not reach this issue on appeal. 
 204. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 205. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630. 
 206. Id. at 627-28. See generally Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Military Commissions Act, the 
Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 73, 73-76 (2007) 
(discussing the efforts of the President to respond to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan by 
proposing statutory language that ultimately led to the passage of several provisions in the Military 
Commissions Act purporting to curtail judicial enforcement of the Geneva Conventions). Section 
948b(g) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified 
in scattered sections at 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) provides that “no alien unlawful enemy combatant 
subject to trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a 
source of rights.” 
 207. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2631 
(2006). 
 208. Id.; see also Noriega v. Pastrana, 564 F.3d 1290, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We find it 
unnecessary to resolve the question of whether the Geneva Conventions are self-executing, because it is 
within Congress’ power to change domestic law, even if the law originally arose from a self-executing 
treaty.” (internal citation omitted)). Vázquez disagrees with this interpretation in part because the MCA 
does not purport to bar the domestic effect of the Geneva Conventions in all forums. Vázquez, supra 
note 206, at 88. 
 209. See Noriega, 564 F.3d 1290, cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1002 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
Brief for International Law Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18, Kiyemba v. Obama, 
130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (No. 08-1234); see also Vázquez, supra note 206, at 87 (arguing that section 
948b(g) of the MCA would be unconstitutional if “it prohibited a criminal defendant from raising a valid 
defense [under the Geneva Conventions] or the tribunal from taking cognizance of it”). 
 210. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009). 
 211. 10 U.S.C.A. § 948b(e) (West 2009) (emphasis added). 
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statutes may supply the relevant right of action for claims brought under 
treaties that confer private rights. Now, we turn to the defensive enforcement of 
treaties. A treaty may be invoked defensively by a private party if a private 
individual is prosecuted or sued under a statute that is inconsistent with a treaty 
provision. The defensive enforcement of treaties can be found in two types of 
cases. In the first, a private party seeks to use the treaty to defend against a 
claim by the United States government. In the second, a private party seeks to 
use the treaty to defend against a claim by another private party under state or 
federal law. 
Defensive enforcement is generally permitted even for treaties that do not 
provide private rights of action or even confer private rights. That is because a 
cause of action exists independent of the treaty.212 While few courts have 
expressly addressed the difference between defensive and offensive uses of 
treaties,213 case law is consistent with this understanding that a treaty may be 
enforced defensively even when there is no private right of action.214 
The Supreme Court first considered an individual’s attempt to invoke a 
treaty to bar a prosecution in United States v. Rauscher.215 There, the Court 
concluded that the provisions of an extradition treaty, permitting prosecution 
for certain enumerated crimes on which the extradition request was based, 
could serve as a defense to the government’s attempt to prosecute the defendant 
for a crime not specified in the extradition treaty.216 
Several decades later, during the Prohibition era, the Court held that a 
treaty that limits the jurisdiction of the United States could be invoked in a 
defensive posture by an individual to challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction in a 
federal prosecution. In Cook v. United States,217 the government seized a 
British vessel that was discovered carrying undocumented liquor eleven-and-
one-half miles from the U.S. coast. The seizure was made pursuant to section 
 
 212. Other commentators have noted that a treaty may be enforced defensively by a private 
party even if the treaty does not contain a private right of action. See, e.g., Thomas Michael McDonnell, 
Defensively Invoking Treaties in American Courts—Jurisdictional Challenges Under the U.N. Drug 
Trafficking Convention by Foreign Defendants Kidnapped Abroad by U.S. Agents, 37 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1401, 1451 (1996) (“[A] defendant being prosecuted or sued under a state or prior federal law that 
is inconsistent with a treaty is entitled to invoke the treaty in court to nullify the state or federal law 
without having to show that the treaty confers a private right of action.”); Carlos M. Vázquez, Treaty-
Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1144 (1992) (“A right of action is 
not necessary to invoke a treaty as a defense.”). 
 213. The Southern District of New York briefly explored the distinction in Indemnity Ins. Co. of 
N. Am. v. Pan Am. Airways. 58 F. Supp. 338, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). 
 214. Whether it must be self-executing or not is a matter of some dispute. Some commentators 
have suggested that a treaty may be enforced defensively by a private party even if it is not self-
executing, though it is not yet a matter of consensus. David Sloss argues that the non-self-execution 
declarations of the Race Convention, the ICCPR, and the Torture Convention were adopted to clarify 
that the treaty makers intended for the human rights treaties not to create a private right of action in U.S. 
courts for certain treaty rights, rather than to bar judicial remedies altogether. David Sloss, Ex Parte 
Young and Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty Violations, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1111-23 
(2000). 
 215. 119 U.S. 407, 430-31 (1886). 
 216. Id. at 423-24. The Rauscher Court discussed domestic legislation bolstering its conclusion 
that an extradited party could not be tried for any offense other than that charged in the extradition 
proceedings. However, the Court did not seem to view the statutes as necessary to reach its decision. Id. 
 217. 288 U.S. 102 (1933). 
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581 of the Tariff Act of 1922, which permitted officers of the Coast Guard “to 
stop and board any vessel at any place” within twelve miles of the U.S. coast to 
examine the manifest and to inspect and search the merchandise.218 
Subsequently, the shipmaster, Cook, was fined for the failure to include the 
liquor in the manifest. Although the seizure was lawful under the terms of the 
Tariff Act, it occurred beyond the territorial limits permitted under a 1924 
treaty between the United States and Britain.219 Cook raised the treaty to 
challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction, arguing that it had modified the Tariff 
Act of 1922. 
The Court had previously held that a court’s power to try a defendant is 
not ordinarily affected by the manner in which the defendant is brought to 
trial.220 However, the Court distinguished this doctrine, known as the Ker-
Frisbie rule, stating that “[t]he objection to the seizure is not that it was 
wrongful merely because made by one upon whom the Government had not 
conferred authority to seize at the place where the seizure was made,” but that, 
“[o]ur government, lacking power to seize, lacked power, because of the 
Treaty, to subject the vessel to our laws.”221 This conclusion had been 
suggested by the Court in Ford v. United States, a case decided a few years 
prior to Cook concerning the same treaty.222 Although the convictions of the 
defendants in Ford were affirmed because they had not raised the jurisdictional 
defense in a timely manner, the Court stated that a seizure in violation of a 
treaty presented questions distinct from the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. As in 
Rauscher, the treaty in Cook and Ford did not concern the rights of individuals, 
but rather the obligations of the state parties.223 
Both Rauscher and Cook were decided in the pre-World War II era, but 
the doctrines established in these cases continue to be treated as precedent.224 
Thus, these cases may be read to support the proposition that a treaty may be 
enforced defensively by an individual who is prosecuted by the government, 
even if the treaty does not give rise to private rights or create a private right of 
action.225 
 
 218. Id. at 107. 
 219. See Convention between the United States and Great Britain for prevention of smuggling of 
intoxicating liquors, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 23, 1924, 43 Stat. 1761. 
 220. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). The Court applied the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 661-62 (1992). 
 221. Cook, 288 U.S. at 121. 
 222. 273 U.S. 593, 605-06 (1927). 
 223. Article I provided that “[t]he High Contracting Parties declare that it is their firm intention 
to uphold the principle that 3 marine miles extending from the coast line outwards and measured from 
low-water mark constitute proper limits of territorial waters.” Cook, 288 U.S. at 110. 
 224. See supra, Subsection II.A.3, for a discussion of Rauscher and the doctrine of specialty. 
 225. Several other Supreme Court cases have considered defensive uses of treaties. In Kolovrat 
v. Oregon, a case decided after World War II, the Court held that an FCN treaty that provided reciprocal 
rights of inheritance to citizens of the United States and Yugoslavia could serve as a defense to a state’s 
action for escheatment to obtain the land of an intestate decedent whose only next of kin lived in 
Yugoslavia. The Court neither discussed nor considered whether the treaty in Kolovrat created private 
rights. 366 U.S. 187 (1961). In some cases, the Court has rejected a treaty defense on its merits. See, 
e.g., Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 
U.S. 138 (1914). Notably, the majority in Medellín cited Kolovrat and Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. as 
examples of Friendship, Navigation, and Commerce treaties that the Court has found to be self-
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Neither case addressed the question of whether a non-self-executing 
treaty may be invoked by an individual in a defensive posture. Both treaties at 
issue in the cases were found to be self-executing and therefore the issue was 
not presented. The Cook Court stated that the treaty between the United States 
and Britain was self-executing and therefore superseded the terms of an 
inconsistent federal statute.226 While the Rauscher Court did not use the term 
“self-executing,” it did engage in an analysis of whether the extradition treaty 
under consideration was directly enforceable in U.S. courts.227 
The Fifth Circuit has also recognized defensive enforcement of a treaty, 
but has apparently limited this mode of enforcement to self-executing treaties—
at least where the treaties limit the jurisdiction of domestic courts. In United 
States v. Postal, decided in 1979, two people were arrested aboard a foreign 
vessel that was seized beyond the twelve-mile limit in violation of the 
Convention on the High Seas.228 Authorities discovered marijuana on board 
and the two individuals were convicted of conspiring to import the drug into 
the United States.229 The defendants raised the violation of the Convention as a 
jurisdictional defense to their prosecution. The Court read Ford and Cook “to 
stand for the proposition that self-executing treaties may act to deprive the 
United States, and hence its courts, of jurisdiction over property and individuals 
that would otherwise be subject to that jurisdiction.”230 It explained, however, 
that “treaties affect the municipal law of the United States only when those 
treaties are given effect by congressional legislation or are, by their nature, self-
executing.”231 Because the Court found that the Convention on the High Seas 
was not self-executing, it held that the defendants could not rely upon it “as a 
defense to the court’s jurisdiction.”232 The Fifth Circuit’s discussion regarding 
self-execution was limited to treaties that limit the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 
The reasoning, however, could be applied more broadly to the defensive 
enforcement of treaties as a whole. 
The Supreme Court has also recognized a treaty-based defense in a 
private lawsuit. In El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, the Supreme 
Court considered whether an airline could enforce a treaty defensively when 
sued by a private individual under state law. The plaintiff, a passenger, had 
been subjected to an intrusive security search before boarding an El Al Israel 
Airlines flight from New York to Tel Aviv and subsequently sued El Al Israel 
Airlines for damages, asserting a state-law personal injury claim.233 The Court 
held that Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention precluded a passenger from 
 
executing based on the language of the treaties. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521-22 (2008). 
Patsone, which involved a treaty granting reciprocal rights to citizens of Italy and the United States, 
would fall into the same category. 232 U.S. at 145-46. 
 226. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933). 
 227. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 410-11, 429-30 (1886). 
 228. 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 229. Id. at 865. 
 230. Id. at 875. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 884. 
 233. 525 U.S. 155, 160 (1999). 
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maintaining an action for damages under state law when the passenger’s claim 
did not satisfy the conditions for liability under the Convention.234 Although 
previously the Court had held that the Convention gives rise to a private right 
of action for individual passengers,235 its decision to permit the Warsaw 
Convention to limit the conditions of liability under state law did not turn on an 
interpretation of the individual rights of airlines under the treaty. Rather, the 
opinion focused on the drafting history and purpose of the Warsaw 
Convention.236 It permitted the Convention to serve as a defense in the same 
manner as a federal law. 
Similarly, in the context of private lawsuits, the Second Circuit’s recent 
decision in Brzak v. United Nations237 is in accordance with Postal and El Al 
Israel Airlines. In Brzak, two United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) employees sued the United Nations and three former United Nations 
officials, alleging sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of federal law, 
as well as various state common law torts. The defendants raised the 
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (CPIUN) as a 
defense, a treaty that the United States has ratified that extends immunity from 
suit to the United Nations and diplomatic envoys. The Court stated that 
determining whether the CPIUN applied to bar the suit turned on whether it 
was self-executing.238 Relying primarily on the negotiation and ratification 
history, the court concluded that the CPIUN was self-executing and thus 
enforceable in court. In reaching the conclusion that the treaty could be applied 
defensively, the court did not find it necessary to determine whether the treaty 
conferred private rights—suggesting, once again, that it is not necessary for a 
treaty to confer private rights in order to be used defensively in court. 
C. Interpretive Enforcement 
Courts often look to treaties when interpreting statutes and, more 
controversially, constitutional provisions. In Murray v. Schooner Charming 
Betsy, Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court: “[A]n act of Congress ought 
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains . . . .”239 This principle, now known as the Charming 
Betsy canon, animates the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, 
which states: “Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed 
so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of 
 
 234. Id. at 176. 
 235. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984). 
 236. The Court reasoned that “[r]ecourse to local law . . . would undermine the uniform 
regulation of international air carrier liability that the Warsaw Convention was designed to foster.” 525 
U.S. at 161. 
 237. 597 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 238. Id. at 111. 
 239. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). This concept was first described three years earlier. 
Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 43 (1801) (“[T]he laws of the United States ought not, if it be 
avoidable, so to be construed as to infract the common principles and usages of nations, or the general 
doctrines of national law.”). 
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the United States.”240 We call this principle interpretive enforcement. 
Like other interpretive canons, interpretive enforcement is a device for 
resolving ambiguity.241 It uses the international legal commitments of the 
United States to fill interpretive gaps and resolve uncertainty that would 
otherwise exist in statutory provisions. The canon does not encourage courts to 
turn a blind eye to the evidence—far from it. If there is clear evidence—such as 
statutory text or legislative history—that the statute was intended to permit a 
violation of international law, then the canon is inapplicable.242 
Using interpretive enforcement, courts may enforce international law by 
interpreting a statute so as not to conflict with an earlier treaty or other 
international agreement—whether self-executing or not.243 In Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp, for example, the Court refused to interpret 
the Par Value Modification Act in a way that would render an Article II treaty 
unenforceable in the United States. It explained, “[t]here is, first, a firm and 
obviously sound canon of construction against finding implicit repeal of a 
treaty in ambiguous congressional action.”244 The Court concluded that 
“[l]egislative silence is not sufficient to abrogate a treaty.”245 
Similarly, in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de 
Honduras, the Supreme Court engaged in interpretive enforcement when it 
found that the U.S. National Labor Relations Board did not have jurisdiction 
over labor disputes on vessels flying a foreign flag. In arriving at that 
conclusion, the Court expressly quoted the Charming Betsy admonition against 
construing an act of Congress to violate the law of nations “if any other 
possible construction remains.”246 It concluded that “for us to sanction the 
exercise of local sovereignty . . . in this ‘delicate field of international relations 
there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly 
expressed.’”247 Since it was unable “to find any such clear expression,” it held 
 
 240. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 114 (1987); see also Steven G. 
Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred 
Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 764 n.75 
(2005) (“[R]eferences to this canon of statutory construction often equate Marshall’s reference to the 
law of nations with international law.”). 
 241. There is a wide range of similar substantive interpretive canons in U.S. law. See, e.g., 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 884 (4th ed. 2007). An excellent 
discussion of the Charming Betsy canon appears in Rebecca Crootof, Note, Judicious Influence: Non-
Self-Executing Treaties and the Charming Betsy Canon, 120 YALE L.J. 1784 (2010). 
 242. If the statute cannot fairly be construed in such a way, it renders the conflicting sections of 
the treaty unenforceable under domestic law. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1997); 
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1956); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115(1)(a) 
(1987). 
 243. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de 
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); 
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. 
912, 921 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 244. 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (quoting Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933)). 
 245. Id. (citing Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 32). 
 246. 372 U.S. at 21 (quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 
(1804)). 
 247. Id. at 21-22 (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)) 
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that jurisdiction did not extend to the ship, consistent with the Treaty of 
Friendship.248 
Interpretive enforcement occurs, as well, in cases that do not expressly 
reference the Charming Betsy canon. For example, in Cook v. United States, the 
Court held that the re-enactment of prior statutes that were in conflict with an 
intervening treaty did not reflect a congressional purpose to supersede the 
international agreement.249 The Court reasoned that “[a] treaty will not be 
deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such 
purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed.”250 
Interpretive enforcement may extend to non-self-executing treaties as 
well as self-executing ones. As scholar and former State Department counselor 
Sarah Cleveland has put it, non-self-executing treaties “can be the basis for . . . 
the construing of a statute to comport with the United States’s international 
obligations.”251 This view is echoed in a recent decision in the case Khan v. 
Holder.252 In that case, Anjam Parvez Khan’s application for asylum in the 
United States was denied by an immigration judge because he had engaged in 
terrorist activity, which is grounds for dismissal under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA). Among other things, Khan argued that the 1967 United 
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees “compel[led] a narrower 
definition of ‘terrorist activity’” than that provided in the statute.253 After 
noting that the Protocol was not self-executing and thus did not carry the force 
of law,254 the Ninth Circuit stated that the Protocol still could influence the 
interpretation of a statute: 
Under Charming Betsy, we should interpret the INA in such a way as to avoid 
any conflict with the Protocol, if possible. Khan’s argument that the terrorism 
bar violates the obligations of the United States in the Protocol fails because the 
Protocol does not conflict with the INA’s definition of “terrorist activity.”255 
This reading is consistent with the interpretive enforcement paradigm—it 
avoids putting the United States in violation of its international legal 
commitments unless the political branches make clear their intention to do so. 
More controversially, courts might engage in interpretive enforcement of 
 
(citations omitted). 
 248. Id. at 22. 
 249. 288 U.S. 102 (1933). 
 250. Id. at 120; see Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 
(1984); see also Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 510 (1947) (holding that the national policy, as expressed 
by the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, was not incompatible with the treaty-granted rights of 
inheritance given to German aliens and that treaty provisions were not necessarily invalidated by the 
outbreak of war); Liberato v. Royer, 270 U.S. 535 (1926) (holding that the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act was not in conflict with a treaty with Italy); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884) 
(holding that later immigration law did not have an effect on the treaty right of resident Chinese aliens to 
reenter the country); United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 108 U.S. 491, 496 (1883) (“The 
laws of Congress are always to be construed so as to conform to the provisions of a treaty, if it be 
possible to do so without violence to their language.”). 
 251. Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 118 (2006) 
(citing Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118). 
 252. Khan v. Holder, 584 F. 3d 773 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 253. Id. at 782. 
 254. Id. at 783. 
 255. Id. 
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international law when interpreting the Constitution. A long-raging debate 
exists over the proper use of international law in constitutional interpretation 
that we do not wish to replay. We note only that the debate thus far has 
relatively little to do with the interpretive enforcement of U.S. legal 
commitments that we discuss in this Article. Proponents and critics alike have 
pointed to Roper v. Simmons as the exemplar case in the debate.256 That case, 
however, did not involve interpretive enforcement of international law, as there 
was no international legal commitment of the United States at issue.257 Several 
international conventions were cited, but only to demonstrate “the 
overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death 
penalty.”258 The Court was thus looking to international practice—including 
foreign law, foreign practice and treaties not ratified by the United States—for 
insight on difficult questions, much in the way it might use an academic book 
or article for similar guidance. It was not, however, engaging in interpretive 
enforcement, which can only occur where there is a U.S. treaty commitment to 
enforce. This requires a directly relevant treaty duly approved by the political 
branches. It further requires no contrary constitutional text or other clear 
evidence that the relevant constitutional provision is best read to permit or 
require a violation of the United States’s international legal obligations under 
the relevant ratified treaty. 
IV.  HOW TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AT HOME 
The courts of the United States are today less willing than at any previous 
time in history to directly enforce the Article II treaty obligations of the United 
States through a private right of action. The decline of such enforcement began 
in the post-World War II era, but reached its peak only recently as lower courts 
have begun treating the Medellín Court’s statement of a “background 
presumption” against finding that treaties create private rights as universal. The 
gap left by the decline in direct enforcement has been filled in part by indirect 
enforcement, defensive enforcement, and interpretive enforcement. Yet there is 
more that can be done to ensure that once the United States makes an 
international legal commitment, it is able to honor that obligation. 
Here we offer three proposals to ensure that the United States’s Article II 
 
 256. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Other cases that arguably take a similar approach include Atkins v. 
Virgina, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (“[W]ithin the world community, the imposition of the death 
penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.” (citation 
omitted)); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.34 (1988) (plurality opinion) (citing two treaties 
prohibiting the juvenile death penalty that the United States had signed but not ratified and a third that 
the U.S. had ratified but that applied only in times of armed conflict and therefore was not directly 
relevant to the facts of the case); and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (considering treaties as 
evidence of “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”). 
 257. The majority opinion included a brief discussion of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, but not in the mode of interpretive enforcement. To the contrary, the Court was 
simply refuting a claim that the 1992 U.S. reservation to Article 6(5) of the Covenant could be read to 
support the petitioner’s claim that there was no consensus against capital punishment for juveniles in 
2005. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567. The Court also cited several conventions that the United States had not 
ratified to demonstrate an international consensus against the juvenile death penalty. Id. at 576. 
 258. Id. at 578. 
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treaty commitments may be more effectively enforced in U.S. courts.259 First, 
Congress could pass legislation that provides for the judicial enforcement of 
obligations established in Article II treaties. Alternatively, the President and 
Congress could make individual international treaty obligations through the 
ordinary legislative process rather than through Article II. Second, the 
executive branch could adopt a clear statement rule, which the Legal Advisor’s 
Office of the State Department would apply to newly concluded treaties. 
Finally, the executive branch could enforce international treaty obligations by 
seeking injunctions against state and municipal agencies violating those 
obligations in cases where the United States risks being placed in violation of a 
national treaty obligation.260 
A. Legislative Enactment 
It has long been clear that Congress can render a non-self executing treaty 
obligation enforceable by passing implementing legislation. We propose that 
Congress harness this widely accepted and uncontroversial rule by passing 
legislation declaring certain classes or categories of treaty obligations self-
executing and enforceable through private rights of action. For example, a 
statute might provide a private right of action to enforce a typical provision in 
private commercial law treaties or might amend the habeas corpus statutes to 
clarify that they provide a private right of action for particular rights guaranteed 
by the Geneva Conventions. 
We are by no means the first to advocate that Congress pass 
implementing legislation to ensure the enforceability of treaty obligations that 
might otherwise be unenforceable in U.S. courts. The American Bar 
Association and American Society of International Law Joint Task Force on 
Treaties in U.S. Law261 has proposed a statutory mechanism to remedy 
situations in which there “is an imminent risk of breach” of a treaty because it 
has been deemed non-self-executing.262 The Task Force was responding to the 
uncertainties created by the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín, and it 
 
 259. A fourth possible method not discussed here is for the President to negotiate and sign a 
sole executive agreement expressly stating that the treaty may be enforced through private rights of 
action in domestic courts. Such agreements would be permissible, however, only when the treaty from 
which the President derives his authority expressly grants the President such authority. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 cmt. c (1987); see also id. (asserting that 
“an executive agreement pursuant to a treaty derives its authority from that treaty and has the same 
effect as the treaty to supersede an earlier inconsistent federal statute (or an earlier United States 
agreement) in United States law”); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. Prt. No. 106-71, TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 86 (2001) [hereinafter CRS 
TREATIES REPORT], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-106SPRT66922/pdf/CPRT-
106SPRT66922.pdf (“Numerous agreements pursuant to treaties have been concluded by the Executive, 
particularly of an administrative nature, to implement in detail generally worded treaty obligations.”]; 
HENKIN, supra note 158, at 219-20 n.** (“In such cases it is assumed that the Senate’s consent to the 
treaty implies consent to do so by supplemental executive agreement.”). Yet even within this narrow 
scope, the precise legal status of such agreements remains in doubt. 
 260. We focus here on proposals for improving the enforcement of Article II treaties. An 
alternative approach would be to conclude the agreements as ex post Congressional-Executive 
Agreements, as argued extensively in Hathaway, Treaties’ End, supra note 14. 
 261. ABA/ASIL Report, supra note 122, at 15. 
 262. Id. 
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sought to address the range of situations that “may occur in which obligations 
contained in a treaty . . . cannot be implemented domestically under existing 
legislation.”263 It proposed legislation that would “authorize the President to 
propose implementation measures that would have the effect of binding federal 
law.”264 The statute would also require Congress to consider the President’s 
implementation proposals on an expedited basis, so that the problem could be 
cured quickly.265 
Congress is currently considering a bill that would render a more limited 
legislative fix to the enforcement problems surrounding the Vienna 
Convention. The Consular Notification Compliance Act is pending, as of this 
writing, in the Senate Judiciary Committee.266 The Act would ensure that rights 
to consular notice and access, protected by the Vienna Convention, may be 
enforced by individuals in U.S. courts in two ways. First, there would be a 
retrospective remedy for all defendants who, as of the time of the bill’s 
passage, had been sentenced to death by a U.S. court but had not received 
timely notice of their consular rights.267 Under section 4(a), individuals 
“convicted and sentenced to death by any Federal or State court” before the 
date of enactment of the bill would have one year to file a habeas petition, 
requesting judicial review of their capital sentences. If the court were to find 
that a defendant’s consular rights had in fact been violated, proceedings could 
be postponed in order to allow for consular access.268 
This proposed Act is a powerful example of Congress’s capacity to create 
a legislative solution to allow the enforcement of treaties by individuals in the 
courts. The bill’s retrospective provision would bring the United States into 
compliance with the ICJ’s decision in Avena by granting defendants collateral 
reviews to determine whether the denial of consular rights was prejudicial, the 
very remedy for which the Avena Court called.269 Meanwhile, the bill’s 
 
 263. Id. at 14. Throughout this paper, we have contended that these uncertainties existed prior 
to the Medellín decision. 
 264. Id. at 15. 
 265. The Task Force summarizes its legislative proposal as follows: 
[T]he proposed legislation sets up a mechanism under which the President could propose 
measures to implement a particular treaty obligation. Under the first alternative, there 
would be a waiting period before the measures become effective. During that period the 
Congress could overturn the measures by a joint resolution of disapproval, which would 
be considered under expedited procedures . . . . Under the second alternative, the 
measures would not become effective unless a joint resolution of approval is enacted —
i.e., the equivalent of new implementing legislation—but expedited procedures would be 
triggered for consideration of such legislation. This would, in effect, allow for the 
enactment of situation-specific implementing legislation on an expedited basis. 
Id. at 15. The Joint Task Force provides a draft of the statutory language in Appendix B of the Report. 
Id. app. B(1). 
 266. S. 1194, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 267. Id. § 4(a). 
 268. Id. § 4(b) (providing that any individual “who is arrested, detained, or held for trial on a 
charge that would expose the individual to a capital sentence . . . may raise a claim of a violation of 
Article 36(1)(b) or (c) of the Vienna Convention . . . before the court with jurisdiction over the charge” 
and that if the court finds that the Vienna Convention has been violated, it “shall postpone any 
proceedings to the extent the court determines necessary to allow for adequate opportunity for consular 
access . . . .”). 
 269. See Hearing on S. 1194 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5-6 (2011) 
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prospective provision would authorize a “defensive” enforcement technique for 
Vienna Convention-based rights270 similar to those described in Section II.B. 
Our proposal builds on—and thus differs from—both the Joint Task 
Force proposal and the Consular Notification Compliance Act. First, we 
encourage the passage of statutes that address classes of treaty obligations, 
rather than just a single treaty. While the Consular Notification Compliance Act 
demonstrates a Congressional effort to preserve the Vienna Convention’s 
enforceability in U.S. courts and give effect to the ICJ’s judgment in Avena, the 
statute we have in mind could be broader; it might, for example, declare that 
certain provisions of bilateral investment treaties will be enforceable in 
domestic courts. 
Second, unlike the Joint Task Force bill, our proposed legislation would 
not be crafted to address situations in which a risk of treaty breaches is 
imminent. The Task Force aims to address problems with treaty compliance as 
they arise, proposing that Congress create a new, expedited review procedure 
that would be triggered at the President’s discretion. We agree with the Task 
Force that it is simply infeasible to analyze all existing treaties individually to 
determine which are vulnerable (because they may be read to be non-self 
executing and are not implemented through legislation) and then to address 
these gaps through individualized legislation. However, Congress could 
prospectively address the judicial enforceability of certain sets of treaty 
obligations of particular significance. This would have the advantage of 
providing greater certainty to parties—both state parties to the treaties and 
private actors affected by the agreements—that are otherwise uncertain about 
whether they may rely on the United States to meet its obligations.271 
It is worth noting that our proposal and the Joint Task Force proposal are 
not mutually exclusive. Our broad-based proactive statutory approach could 
work in conjunction with the emergency statutory mechanism proposed by the 
ABA/ASIL Task Force. The Task Force proposal is primarily aimed at 
unforeseen situations in which there is an imminent risk of breach of an 
individual treaty. Our proposal, however, is best suited for classes of treaty 
obligations that can be identified and prospectively addressed to avoid breach 
in advance. 
 
(statement of Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Bruce C. Swartz). It is worth noting that the Act is already 
gaining attention in the courtroom. Humberto Leal Garcia is a Mexican national who had been denied 
his rights to consular notice and access as guaranteed by the Vienna Convention and was then sentenced 
to death for murder by a Texas court. After the ICJ’s decision in Avena, Leal petitioned the Supreme 
Court (with the United States government filing an amicus brief in his favor) arguing that his execution 
would amount to a breach of the United States’s obligations under international law. Leal also argued 
that the Court should use its “All Writs” power to stay his execution until the fate of the Consular 
Notification Compliance Act was decided. The Court denied the petition on July 7, 2011. Garcia v. 
Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011). 
 270. Hearing on S. 1194, supra note 269, at 6-7 (noting that the bill “shall not be construed to 
create any additional remedy other than possible postponement” of one’s criminal trial “to allow an 
opportunity for consular notification and assistance”). 
 271. Our prospective approach would also avoid any possible legislative veto problem that 
might be triggered by a mechanism for ex post expedited bicameral review through a joint congressional 
resolution of approval or disapproval. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding unconstitutional 
section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed a majority of either the House 
of Representatives or Senate to veto the Attorney General’s decision to suspend deportation of an alien). 
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One area that might be a focus of the breed of legislation we propose is 
private commercial international law—particularly treaties of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation (sometimes concluded as treaties of “amity”). The 
recent shift against a presumption of self-execution has the potential to bring 
about serious consequences for these treaties—and therefore for the country’s 
international commercial relations. Even during the post-World War II era, 
courts held that these private commercial law treaties created judicially 
enforceable private rights of action.272 Recently, however, the D.C. Circuit 
threw this understanding into doubt when it held that the 1957 Treaty of Amity 
between the United States and Iran did not give rise to a private right of 
action.273 This decision stands in stark contrast to earlier decisions considering 
the judicial enforceability of this and similar treaties,274 and in the process upset 
settled expectations that such treaties would give rise to private rights of action. 
By passing a statute reaffirming the previously settled expectation that certain 
individual rights enumerated in Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties 
give rise to private rights of action in U.S. federal district courts, Congress 
could remove the cloud of uncertainty that now hangs over these treaties—
many of which date back more than one hundred years and form the backbone 
of longstanding commercial relationships. 
Extradition treaties are another example of a class of treaties that should 
be targeted by our proposed statutory mechanism. Often relying on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rauscher,275 courts have assumed 
that extradition treaties create private rights that may be enforced defensively 
or in habeas petitions.276 The Court explicitly held in Rauscher that “courts are 
bound to take judicial notice of, and to enforce in any appropriate proceeding 
the rights of persons growing out of [the extradition] treaty,”277 and that 
decision has never been overturned. However, footnote three of Medellín might 
call this conclusion into question. Medellín announced not only a presumption 
against finding that treaties give rise to private rights of action but also a 
 
 272. See, e.g., Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 322, 341 (1924) (holding that the Treaty of 
Amity between the United States and Japan “operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, state or 
national; and it will be applied and given authoritative effect by the courts”); Choi v. Kim, 50 F.3d 244, 
248 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the FCN Treaty between Korea and the United States was enforceable 
in U.S. courts); Vagenas v. Cont’l Gin Co., 988 F.2d 104, 106 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that the FCN 
Treaty between Greece and the United States was enforceable in U.S. courts). 
 273. McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.3d 485 (D.C. Cir. 2008). For a 
discussion of the McKesson decision, see supra Subsection II.C.I. The Medellín Court did note that it 
had held a number of these treaties self-executing, but it stated that it did so “based on ‘the language of 
the[se] Treat[ies].’” Medellín v, Texas, 552 U.S. 419, 521 (2007). 
 274. See supra note 272; Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, 525 
(D.D.C 1980) (“Plaintiffs can assert their rights to recover damages in this Court for violations of the 
Treaty and international law. First, the right of individuals and companies to enforce a private right of 
action in a United States court under the property protection provisions of a treaty of friendship, 
commerce, and navigation has consistently been upheld . . . . Second, since Article IV, paragraph 2 of 
the Treaty is self-executing, plaintiffs have a right of action before this Court.”). 
 275. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). For our discussion of courts’ approaches to the enforcement of 
extradition treaties in habeas petitions, see supra Subsection II.A.3. 
 276. See, e.g., Gallo-Chamorro v. United States, 233 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 277. 119 U.S. at 419. 
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presumption against finding that treaties create private rights.278 While 
extradition treaties affect the rights of individuals, they are not typically 
phrased to refer to individual rights. Rather, they refer to the relationship of the 
contracting parties—the states.279 In this respect, an individual’s attempt to 
invoke an extradition treaty in a habeas petition is similar to Medellín’s attempt 
to enforce Article 94(1) of the United Nations Charter in U.S. courts. Indeed, 
the dissent in Medellín cited Rauscher as an example of a treaty provision 
similar to Article 94 of the U.N. Charter that the Court has found to be self-
executing.280 Given the risk of uncertainty and confusion in this area of law, a 
statute clarifying private rights arising under extradition treaties would be well 
advised. 
This first proposal is primarily backward-looking. It aims to provide a 
practical, efficient, and politically feasible solution to the uncertainty created by 
the Court’s decision in Medellín for existing treaties. It is aimed, in particular, 
at treaties that have been assumed by parties and courts to be enforceable but 
which may not, in fact, be enforced by the courts post-Medellín. We now turn 
to a proposal that is primarily forward-looking. It offers the political branches a 
mechanism for preventing uncertainty about future enforcement of a treaty at 
the time of its creation. 
B. Clear Statement Rule 
In Medellín, the Supreme Court concluded that a treaty was not directly 
enforceable in court unless the treaty contained “explicit textual expression 
about self-execution.”281 Read in its most favorable light, the intuition behind 
this requirement is obvious: If the intention to make a treaty self-executing is 
not clear from the text of the agreement, how does the court know that the 
political branches intended to adopt a self-executing treaty? We argue here, 
however, that the text is one guide to the intentions of the political branches, 
but it is not the only one. A clear statement by the President and the Senate 
indicating that they intend the agreement to be self-executing should be 
regarded as equally compelling evidence that the treaty was intended to be—
and should be enforced by the courts as—the Supreme Law of the Land. We 
call this the Clear Statement Rule. 
In an ideal world, when a treaty is intended to be directly enforceable in 
U.S. courts, the treaty would include explicit language to that effect. This is 
possible in the context of bilateral treaties, for the United States has only a 
 
 278. For an explanation of the distinction, see supra Subsection II.A.3. 
 279. See, for example, the Extradition Treaty Between the United States and Argentina, U.S.-
Arg., June 10, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-18, which the President described as “follow[ing] 
generally the form and content of extradition treaties recently concluded by the United States.” Message 
from the President of the United States Transmitting Extradition Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Argentine Republic, Signed at Buenos Aires on June 10, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. 105-
18, at III (July 30, 1997), available at http://www.oea.org/juridico/mla/en/traites/en_traites-ext-usa-
arg.pdf. 
 280. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 556 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 281. Id. at 562. 
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single other party with which it must negotiate the text.282 But in the context of 
multilateral treaties with numerous signatory parties, including “explicit textual 
expression about self-execution” may be an impossible task. As scholars have 
observed and as Justice Breyer noted in his dissent in Medellín, every country 
has its own internal laws governing how treaties become law domestically. For 
that reason, the conventional practice—at least for multilateral treaties—has 
been not to specify matters of self-execution in the text of the legal instrument 
itself.283 
The Clear Statement Rule offers an alternative approach. Under the new 
Rule, when the President submits an Article II treaty to the Senate for its advice 
and consent, he will include a statement indicating whether particular 
obligations in the treaty are understood to be self-executing and whether they 
should be directly judicially enforced or not. If significant treaty obligations are 
declared to be non-self-executing, the statement will indicate how they will be 
enforced instead. The Clear Statement would be embedded in a formal 
“Declaration” or “Understanding” that would be part of the treaty package 
approved by the Senate. Including such a statement would ensure that the 
Senate and President have a shared understanding of the terms of the 
agreement, and it would also provide clear notice to U.S. treaty partners.284 
Our proposed Clear Statement Rule builds on, but modifies, decades-long 
practices that many U.S. presidents have adopted when negotiating treaties. In 
1977, President Carter submitted four human rights treaties to the Senate for its 
advice and consent, attaching proposed “declarations” that announced those 
treaties to be non-self-executing.285 The Senate granted its advice and consent 
to the treaties with the declarations attached. Whatever the merits of the 
substantive decision to render the agreements non-self-executing, the addition 
of the declarations had the virtue of eliminating any ambiguity regarding the 
 
 282. E.g., Treaty with Australia Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, U.S.-Austl., pmbl., 
Sept. 5, 2007, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-10 (“Understanding that the provisions of this Treaty are self-
executing in the United States . . . .”); Treaty with United Kingdom Concerning Defense Trade 
Cooperation, U.S.-U.K., pmbl., June 21-26, 2007, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-7 (same). However, even 
though these two bilateral treaties included statements of self-execution in their preambles, the Senate 
ended up conditioning ratification on declarations that the treaties were not self-executing. See Duncan 
Hollis, A Head-Spinning Self-Execution Story, OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 11, 2010), http://opiniojuris.org/2010 
/11/11/a-head-spinning-self-execution-story. The outcome—treaties with a statement of self-execution 
in the text, coupled with declarations of non-self-execution attached by the Senate—creates a confusing 
landscape regarding the treaty’s enforcement. While some scholars contend the Senate’s intent should 
govern, see id., others might disagree. The whole episode suggests that the wiser course of action might 
be for parties to avoid making statements about self-execution within a treaty’s text altogether, and 
allow each treaty partner to include statements about self-execution or non-self-execution in their 
ratification documents. Our Clear Statement Rule would help facilitate the latter type of practice. 
 283. See Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 540, 543-44 (2008); Vázquez, supra note 25, at 679-80. For Justice Breyer’s endorsement of 
this position, see Medellín, 552 U.S. at 547-50 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 284. Such a practice seems to be emerging already. For example, a tax convention with 
Hungary on which the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voted to recommend the Senate give its 
advice and consent included a declaration—highlighted and reaffirmed in the Senate Report—that the 
Convention “is self-executing, as is the case generally with income tax treaties.” Tax Convention with 
Hungary, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 112-4, at 4-5 (2011). 
 285. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining to 
Human Rights, S. EXEC. DOC. NOS. C, D, E, F, 95-2, at VI, XVIII (1978) (stating that the treaties were 
not self-executing). 
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enforceability of the treaties in U.S. courts. Thereafter, that became common 
practice for human rights treaties. Between 1977 and 2008, the Senate gave its 
advice and consent to numerous human rights treaties with declarations of non-
self-execution appended.286 Moreover, the President and Senate adopted that 
process for some non-human rights treaties as well.287 Except for one well-
known decision in the D.C. Circuit in the 1950s,288 no federal appeals court has 
ever questioned the validity of a declaration of non-self-execution.289 
Declarations of self-execution (as opposed to non-self-execution) are 
admittedly a newer phenomenon. The President and Senate have begun to 
attach such declarations to treaties in the wake of Medellín,290 but their legal 
validity has yet to be rigorously assessed by scholars or tested in court. Carlos 
 
 286. 1 MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, at 179, 190, 
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/25, U.N. Sales No. E.07.V.3 (2007) (showing that the Senate added a 
declaration of non-self execution to the ICCPR in 1992); id. at 302-05 (adding the same for the 
Convention Against Torture in 1994); id. at 138 (adding the same for the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1994); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 415–16, 419–22 
(2000) (arguing that all human rights treaties since the 1970s have had such declarations). But see 
Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 107-4, at 16–18 (2002) (ratified by the 
Senate with no declaration regarding self-execution). 
 287. See 1 MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, supra note 
286, at 236, 240 (U.N. Convention Against Corruption); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and 
Treaty Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131, 137 (“Before Medellín, the Senate had utilized these formal 
non-self-execution declarations in connection with a few treaties outside the human rights area as well, 
but such declarations were uncommon.”). 
 288. Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 247 F.2d 538, 543-44 (D.C. Cir. 1957) 
(holding that the “Niagara Reservation,” which was attached by the Senate to a U.S.-Canada treaty and 
declared the treaty to be non-self-executing, was a legal nullity because it was “purely domestic” and 
concluding that the treaty power only authorized the President and Senate to ratify mutual obligations 
with foreign parties, not to condition the domestic effects of those international agreements through 
declarations). 
 289. E.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004) (assuming in dictum that a 
declaration of non-self-execution attached to the ICCPR was legally valid); Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 
123, 132, 140-42 (3d Cir. 2005) (assuming that the declaration of non-self-execution attached to the 
Convention Against Torture was legally valid in U.S. courts); Vázquez, supra note 283, at 675 (“To 
date, the lower courts have enforced declarations of non-self-execution without pausing to consider their 
validity.”). There is an active scholarly debate about the validity of such declarations and reservations. 
See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 158, at 202 (arguing that the practice of non-self-execution declarations 
“is anti-Constitutional in spirit and highly problematic as a matter of law” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 286, at 415-16, 419-22 (arguing that the Senate and 
President have a broad constitutional power to limit the domestic effect of treaties as a part of the Treaty 
Clause power); Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 49, 64 (1997); 
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1929 (2005) 
(arguing that in certain instances, when “the treaty power overlaps with Congress’s enumerated powers . 
. . the greater power to make self-executing treaties includes the lesser power to leave the 
implementation of a treaty to Congress”); William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277 
(1995); Vázquez, supra note 283, at 683 (arguing that “U.S. treatymakers have the power to 
‘unilaterally’ limit the domestic judicial enforceability of the treaties they conclude” through 
reservations and declarations of non-self-execution, but only as a function of the “reservations” practice 
at the international level under the Vienna Convention). 
 290. See, e.g., Tax Convention with Hungary, supra note 284, at 5 (“The committee has 
included one declaration in the recommended resolution of advice and consent. The declaration states 
that the Convention is self-executing, as is the case generally with income tax treaties.”); see also 
Bradley, supra note 287, at 139 (noting that since Medellín, “the Senate has for the first time been 
attaching self-execution as well as non-self-execution declarations to its advice and consent to some 
treaties”). 
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Vázquez has documented that in 2008, over a dozen treaties were ratified with 
affirmative declarations of self-execution,291 and some declarations even made 
the important but subtle distinction between self-execution and judicially 
enforceable rights.292 
The question remains, however, whether such statements are 
constitutional. The constitutional concern focuses on a small slice of treaties. It 
involves in particular situations in which a declaration of self-execution would 
enhance the domestic effect of treaties beyond that required by the treaty, 
turning an agreement that is by its own terms non-self-executing into a self-
executing agreement.293 That would be problematic for two key reasons. First, 
it would permit the federal government to use the Treaty Clause power to make 
domestically enforceable law beyond the bounds of the enumerated powers 
without the full agreement of a foreign government to those terms. In effect, 
then, it might be seen as an effort to expand the Treaty Clause power of the 
federal government vis-à-vis the state governments, effectively giving the 
federal government greater scope to legislate than is constitutionally 
permissible.294 Second, such a declaration of self-execution could represent an 
effort by the Senate and President to usurp the power to make federal law 
without the participation of the House of Representatives. True, the 
Constitution grants them the power to make treaties without the House, but it 
does so for reasons specifically connected to the process of making 
international agreements. And that power is limited in scope by the necessity of 
gaining a commitment on the part of another state.295 If a unilateral statement of 
self-execution effectively purports to expand the commitment made in the 
agreement, the argument goes, it expands the federal legal commitment beyond 
that contemplated in the Constitution.296 
These arguments are not to be dismissed lightly. But it is important to 
 
 291. Vázquez, supra note 283, at 670. Early examples of this new practice can be found at 154 
CONG. REC. S9328–32 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2008) (detailing senatorial advice and consent for mutual 
legal assistance, extradition, and tax treaties, all of which contain a declaration stating, “This Treaty is 
self-executing”); Tax Convention with Iceland, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-17, at 7 (2008); S. EXEC. REP. 
NO. 110-16, at 8 (2008); Protocol Amending 1980 Tax Convention with Canada, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 
110-15, at 10 (2008); Treaty with Malaysia on Mutual Legal Assistance, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-14, at 6 
(2008); Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with the European Union, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-13, at 11–21 
(2008); and Extradition Treaties with the European Union, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-12, at 10–20 (2008). 
 292. See, e.g., An Amendment and Three Protocols to the 1980 Conventional Weapons 
Convention, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-22, at 14 (2008) (“With the exception of Articles 7 and 8, this 
Protocol is self-executing. This Protocol does not confer private rights enforceable in United States 
courts.”). 
 293. Carlos Vázquez provides a thoughtful analysis of this issue. Vázquez, supra note 283, at 
685-94 (arguing, inter alia, that if Medellín is read to establish a default rule that treaties are not self-
executing, then “the declarations would . . . purport to make federal law”; and the declarations would be 
unconstitutional under the separation-of-powers principles, because “the President and Senate do not 
have the power to make federal law by themselves” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 294. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 417 (1919). 
 295. For more on the origins of the Treaty Clause, see Hathaway, Treaties’ End, supra note 14 
and especially David Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the 
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000). 
 296. See Vázquez, supra note 283, at 687-88. But see Bradley, supra note 287, at 154-55 
(arguing that “recent self-execution declarations attached by the Senate” should be deemed 
constitutionally valid because the intent of the U.S. treaty-makers, not the collective intent of the treaty 
parties, should govern). 
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recognize their scope. The objections apply only to statements that effectively 
expand the legal commitment beyond that contemplated in the international 
agreement. There is no evidence that the declarations of self-execution have 
been used in this manner. Similarly, our Clear Statement Rule is intended not to 
expand the legal obligations beyond those in the agreement but to clearly state 
that the President and Senate understood the agreement to be judicially 
enforceable. In effect, where there is a Clear Statement, it operates to flip back 
the presumption in favor of self-execution. If the text of the treaty 
unambiguously intends action by the political branches before enforcement—
for example, if the treaty expressly requires states to implement the agreement 
through legislative action—then a Clear Statement that the non-self-executing 
terms of the treaty are self-executing would not be appropriate. But 
implementing legislation to make these terms enforceable would be. If the text 
leaves room for doubt—for example, if it provides that states shall “undertake 
to comply”297—then a Clear Statement that the treaty is self-executing should 
be treated with deference by the courts. 
As an alternative to our Clear Statement Rule, the President could include 
a statement about the treaty’s self-executing nature in the treaty transmittal 
package. This statement would—along with any congressional reports and 
hearings—become part of the treaty’s legislative history, to which a court could 
refer in seeking to understand the intent of the political branches. Such an 
approach would be less ideal than the Clear Statement Rule, but it would offer 
another avenue for the President to clarify his expectations about a treaty’s 
enforceability. 
There has been significant criticism of presidential signing statements—
criticism that might appear to apply to the proposal to encourage the President 
to address self-execution in the treaty transmittal package.298 Critics regard 
signing statements as an unlawful expansion of the President’s veto power from 
the right to say “yes” or “no” to the right to determine the substantive content 
of statutes.299 These concerns have significantly less force, however, in the 
 
 297. This is the treaty language at issue in Medellín. Although the Court found that the treaty 
was not self-executing, it did so by applying a presumption against self-execution. Under our proposal, 
if there is a clear statement of self-execution, then the presumption is flipped, and the ambiguity 
resolved in favor of self-execution, rather than against it. 
 298. In 2006, the American Bar Association issued a report declaring that President George W. 
Bush’s use of signing statements was threatening the rule of law. See AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE 
TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS & THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 
(2006), available at http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/files_flutter/1273179616signstate 
report.pdf. By 2007, President Bush had in fact issued 118 signing statements challenging some 
provision of a law he had signed. See T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33667, 
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 9 (2007), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf. Senator Arlen Specter responded with a 
bill that would have prevented courts from looking to presidential signing statements when interpreting 
statutes. The Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2006, S. 3731, 109th Cong. § 4 (2006). Despite the 
controversy, lower courts have occasionally looked to such statements. See United States v. Story, 891 
F.2d 988, 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (deferring to a presidential signing statement on the grounds that “the 
Executive Branch participated in the negotiation of the compromise legislation”); Frolova v. Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1985) (looking to the President’s signing 
statement in interpreting the Helsinki Accords). 
 299. E.g., Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as 
Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
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context of treaty ratification. The President has a special role in negotiating 
treaties that is distinct from his role in the Article I process. For treaties, the 
President drafts the document’s text and consults with foreign parties. 
Arguably, the President best understands the intentions of treaty partners.300 In 
part for this reason, federal courts regularly give substantial deference to the 
executive branch’s interpretation of treaties.301 In Kolovrat v. Oregon, for 
instance, the Supreme Court looked to “diplomatic notes exchanged between 
the responsible agencies of the United States and of Yugoslavia” both before 
and after the treaty was signed, as well as “instructions issued by our State 
Department” for carrying out the treaty, to conclude that “the 1881 Treaty, now 
and always, has been construed as providing for inheritance by both countries’ 
nationals . . . .”302 According to one scholar, the Supreme Court deferred to the 
executive branch’s interpretation of a treaty in “the vast majority” of the cases 
he surveyed, except for when the government’s view was “poorly reasoned” or 
called for an unconstitutional result.303 Moreover, the transmittal package is 
provided to the Senate prior to seeking its consent, significantly blunting any 
concern that the President might seek to undermine the Senate through 
unilateral interpretation.304 
Accordingly, presidents can make statements regarding self-execution in 
the treaty transmittal package and hope that those statements will prove 
 
363, 367 (1987). Others argue in favor of looking to presidential signing statements when interpreting 
statutes, given that the President plays a key role in the legislative process under the Presentment Clause 
and that he is therefore part of a statute’s “enacting coalition.” See Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, 
Jr., Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., O.L.C., to The Litigation Strategy Working Group 1 (Feb. 5, 1986), 
available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/Acc060-89-269-box6-
SG-LSWG-AlitotoLSWG-Feb1986.pdf; Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing 
Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 348 (2006). 
 300. See William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Critique, 66 
IND. L.J. 699, 717 n.80 (1991) (“A distinction should also be made between statutes and treaties. The 
President’s power to negotiate treaties might give him an interpretive power that he lacks in the context 
of legislation.”); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1527 n.317 (2000) (arguing that deference to presidential signing statements for 
treaties—but not statutes—could be justified); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
74, 122 (2000) (arguing that presidential statements do have a “prominent role” in treaty interpretation, 
but that this is because “the president’s role in treaty formation differs importantly from his role in the 
legislative process . . . .”). 
 301. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 326(2) 
(1987) (“Courts in the United States have final authority to interpret an international agreement for 
purposes of applying it as law in the United States, but will give great weight to an interpretation made 
by the Executive Branch.”). 
 302. 366 U.S. 187, 194-95 (1961); see also Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929) (“The 
history of article 7 and references to its provisions in diplomatic exchanges between the United States 
and Denmark [both before and after ratification] leave little doubt that its purpose was both to relieve the 
citizens of each country from onerous taxes upon their property within the other and to enable them to 
dispose of such property . . . .”). 
 303. David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953, 
961-62 (1994). 
 304. This lies in contrast to the executive memorandum at issue in Medellín, in which President 
Bush declared that the ICJ’s decision in Avena was to be binding on state courts well after the Senate 
had ratified the treaty. In fact, the Court’s analysis rested on the fact that it deemed the memorandum to 
be an ex post effort to substantively change the terms of the treaty by presidential fiat. 552 U.S. 491, 525 
(2008) (“The President has an array of political and diplomatic means available to enforce international 
obligations, but unilaterally converting a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one is not 
among them.”). 
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persuasive to future courts. Nonetheless, such unilateral statements by the 
President are likely to be less effective and persuasive than a formal 
Declaration, voted upon by the Senate in the course of the treaty approval 
process. 
Proponents of international law might be concerned that the Clear 
Statement Rule we propose here will render already-ratified treaties more 
insecure. If, after all, Clear Statements need to appear at the time of the 
Senate’s advice and consent, and if earlier treaties do not include such 
statements, then courts may misconstrue the silence in earlier treaties as 
meaningful. This can be avoided in part by careful wording. For example, a 
recent Senate report explained that “[t]he declaration states that the Convention 
is self-executing, as is the case generally with income tax treaties.”305 This 
declaration thus serves to both make clear the intended effect of the treaty at 
hand and the general nature of tax treaties. 
Moreover, the concern that a new practice of Clear Statements will 
undermine earlier treaties that do not possess such Clear Statements gives 
judges less credit than they deserve. Prior to Medellín, statements of self-
execution were not used in many cases because they were considered 
unnecessary. Post-Medellín, the landscape has changed. If the State Department 
adopts a Clear Statement Rule, and with it a considered practice of including 
clear information regarding whether the treaty is self-executing or not at the 
time of the Senate’s advice and consent, courts will be able to recognize that 
the absence of such statements in earlier treaties does not necessarily mean that 
those treaties were intended to be non-self-executing. The State Department 
could even further protect against such concerns by issuing an express 
statement of this new practice, or by revising the relevant regulations. In short, 
the Clear Statement Rule offers a way of addressing ambiguity about the 
judicial enforceability of treaties going forward, but should have little or no 
impact on treaties already ratified. 
C. Public Right of Action 
The executive branch has the authority to enforce international treaty 
obligations by seeking an injunction against state and municipal agencies 
violating those obligations. We call this a “Public Right of Action,” in contrast 
with a private right of action. 
The doctrine upon which the Public Right of Action is based arose in a 
line of cases from the turn of the century that allowed the federal government to 
sue in equity to enforce its sovereign rights and obligations.306 The cases 
culminated in the Supreme Court’s 1895 decision in In re Debs,307 in which the 
 
 305. Tax Convention with Hungary, supra note 284, at 5. 
 306. See RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 811-20 (4th ed. 1996); see also United 
States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 367 (1888) (allowing the Attorney General to sue in equity 
for the revocation of certain fraudulently obtained patents); United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 
U.S. 273 (1888) (same). 
 307. 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
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federal government sought to protect interstate commerce by requesting an 
injunction prohibiting railroad workers from striking. The Court found 
sufficient justification for the injunction on the merits, but it concluded that 
seeking equitable decrees was an appropriate means for the federal government 
to “enforce in any part of the land the full and free exercise of all national 
powers.”308 The Court reasoned: 
Every government, entrusted by the very terms of its being, with powers and 
duties to be exercised and discharged for the general welfare, has a right to 
apply to its own courts for any proper assistance in the exercise of the one and 
the discharge of the other . . . . The obligations which it is under to promote the 
interest of all, and to prevent the wrongdoing of one resulting in injury to the 
general welfare, is often of itself sufficient to give it a standing in court.309 
In subsequent years, courts have applied this reasoning to provide the federal 
government standing to bring lawsuits against public and private actors where 
the federal government seeks to use the suits to promote the national welfare—
by, for example, enforcing civil rights laws and preventing interference with 
interstate commerce.310 
The obvious question, of course, is whether the violation of a treaty 
obligation is the kind of national harm that entitles the federal government to 
bring an action for injunctive relief against a state or local government. The 
Supreme Court has suggested that it is, although only in dicta. In Sanitary 
District of Chicago v. United States, the federal government successfully 
enjoined an Illinois state agency from diverting water from Lake Michigan.311 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court that the United 
States had “a standing in this suit . . . to carry out treaty obligations to a foreign 
power bordering upon some of the Lakes concerned . . . .”312 Although the case 
was resolved on statutory and constitutional grounds, the Court’s endorsement 
of a Public Right of Action on the basis of treaty violations was clear.313 
Despite the breadth of Justice Holmes’s assertion in Sanitary District, the 
Supreme Court has not directly revisited the issue of whether the United States 
can sue state and local governments to enjoin them from violating treaty 
obligations.314 Several lower courts have addressed the issue, however. The 
 
 308. Id. at 582. 
 309. Id. This principle had previously been stated by the Court in American Bell Telephone Co., 
128 U.S. at 367 (concluding that the government did not need to have a “direct pecuniary interest” in a 
case, but may sue “to protect the public from the monopoly of the patent which was procured by fraud”). 
 310. See, e.g., United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960) (allowing suit 
by the United States to enjoin respondent companies from depositing industrial solids in the Calumet 
River without obtaining the requisite permit); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1947) 
(allowing suit by the United States to determine ownership and rights over submerged land); United 
States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 11-16 (5th Cir. 1963), reh’g denied, 320 F.2d 870 (1963) (per 
curiam) (granting injunctive relief to the United States to prevent racial segregation); United States v. 
U.S. Klans, Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897, 902 (M.D. Ala. 1961) (granting 
preliminary injunction in favor of the United States and enjoining the defendants from interfering with 
the travel of passengers in interstate commerce). 
 311. 266 U.S. 405 (1925). 
 312. Id. at 425-26 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 313. See id. at 426-32. 
 314. A year after Sanitary District, the Supreme Court held that the United States has “the right 
to invoke the aid of a court of equity in removing unlawful obstacles to the fulfillment of its 
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earliest and most direct affirmation of a Public Right of Action to enforce a 
treaty came from the Eastern District of New York in its 1971 holding in 
United States v. City of Glen Cove.315 There, the court held that the federal 
government could enjoin a city from taxing Soviet assets that were protected by 
a treaty.316 Relying upon Sanitary District, the district court held, “the United 
States may sue to prevent state action which would violate a treaty obligation 
of the United States,”317 explaining that the “conduct of foreign relations would 
be hampered and embarrassed if the United States Government were powerless 
to require units of local government to comply with treaty obligations, and if a 
treaty could be enforced only by the foreign government making itself a party 
to litigation before state or federal courts.”318 
Several courts have agreed with the holding in Glen Cove. In United 
States v. County of Arlington, for example, the Fourth Circuit held: “[t]he 
United States can sue to enforce its policies and laws, even when it has no 
pecuniary interest in the controversy. This principle has been invoked to enable 
the United States to honor its treaty obligations to a foreign state.”319 More 
recently, in Mora v. New York, the Second Circuit noted that the federal 
government’s ability to “sue state and local governments to ensure compliance” 
was one of the reasons international treaty obligations have not been entirely 
“deprive[d] . . . of force” by the lack of a private right of action.320  
Courts have also cited Sanitary District in opinions allowing the federal 
government to intervene in various suits, in order to preserve the nation’s treaty 
obligations. For instance, in Tachiona v. United States, the Second Circuit held 
that the Department of Justice had standing to intervene and appeal a district 
court ruling that potentially placed the United States in violation of the U.N. 
Convention on Privileges and Immunities.321 Similarly, in Bennett v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, a D.C. district court held that the United States could move to 
quash writs of attachment issued against Iran in a private suit, given the 
government’s interest in honoring U.S. obligations under the Algiers Accord 
 
obligations.” United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 194-95 (1926). Thus, the Court upheld an 
injunction issued at the request of the Attorney General, enjoining Minnesota state officials from 
depriving Native Americans of land rights given to them in prior agreements with the federal 
government. Id. The Court, however, was not clear whether the “obligations” owed by the federal 
government to the Native Americans stem from the international agreements or from the unique 
fiduciary relationship the Court ascribes to the federal government with regard to Native American 
groups. See id. at 193-96, 207-12; see also HENKIN, supra note 158, at 484 n.128. Since Minnesota, the 
closest the Court has come to revisiting the matter was Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Medellín, 
in which he cited Sanitary District for the proposition that the Court “has also made clear that the 
Executive has inherent power to bring a lawsuit ‘to carry out treaty obligations.’” Medellín v. Texas, 
552 U.S. 491, 565 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Sanitary District, 266 U.S. at 425-26). The 
majority opinion neither agreed nor disagreed with Justice Breyer’s statement. 
 315. 322 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff’d 450 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam). 
 316. Id. at 152. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. 669 F.2d 925, 929 (4th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 
 320. 524 F.3d 183, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 321. 386 F.3d 205, 212 (2d Cir. 2004). In Mora, the Second Circuit also cited Sanitary District 
in support of the proposition that the United States has authority to bring an action to enforce 
compliance with a treaty obligation. 524 F.3d at 198. 
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and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.322 Both cases cited 
Sanitary District.323 
There are also recent signs that the government regards a Public Right of 
Action as a viable option for enforcing treaties. The Legal Adviser to the State 
Department has contended to the Supreme Court that there is a “longstanding 
principl[e]” that the United States can “bring an action in court to enforce 
compliance with a treaty obligation” without statutory authorization.324 And in 
a September 2011 report recommending that the Senate ratify a bilateral 
investment treaty (“BIT”) with Rwanda,325 the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations indicated that it shared this view. The report recognized that several 
provisions of the treaty were not self-executing, such as provisions relating to 
procedures for resolving disputes under the treaty. But it suggested that the 
federal government could use a Public Right of Action to enforce the treaty 
should states refuse to comply. Specifically, the report endorsed the views of 
the Director of the Office of Investment Affairs for the State Department, who 
had explained to Congress that “should an arbitral decision [issued pursuant to 
the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanism] conclude that law of a U.S. state is 
inconsistent with the BIT, the U.S. government could, if necessary, choose to 
initiate a legal action against the state to ensure compliance with a self-
executing provision of the BIT.”326 
The Public Right of Action is thus an option available to the government, 
but one that is likely to be used sparingly. The key drawback to using the 
Public Right of Action is that it places the federal government in an adversarial 
position vis-à-vis a state or local government. That is not only politically 
challenging, but also can be corrosive of the cooperative federal arrangement 
that is an essential element of the United States’s political landscape. In many 
cases, normal political channels—discussions between the federal government 
and local officials—will prove more effective at changing state or local 
government behavior to comply with international law obligations of the 
United States. Indeed, the experience of U.S. compliance with the Vienna 
Convention’s requirements after Medellín shows that these tools can be quite 
effective, at least in addressing future compliance. There, the federal 
government advised local prosecutors and police departments about proper 
 
 322. 604 F. Supp. 2d 152, 167 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 618 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The 
plaintiffs’ argument that the United States lacks standing in this action is without merit and essentially 
frivolous. This Circuit has consistently recognized that the United States has standing to bring actions 
necessary to uphold its foreign policy obligations under international agreements, particularly those 
relating to Iran.”); see also Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 
Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 234 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 323. Tachiona, 386 F.3d at 212; Bennett, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 167. 
 324. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, Bustillo v. 
Johnson, 546 U.S. 1213 (2006) (No. 04-10566); see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 15, Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984) (citing Sanitary 
District); Brief for the United States in Opposition at 16-17, Tachiona v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2020 
(2004) (No. 05-879) (same). 
 325. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-
Rwanda, Feb. 19, 2008, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-23. 
 326. Id. at 11. 
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compliance procedures. Most local governments then began complying with 
the requirement that foreign citizens’ consulates be notified when their citizens 
are “arrested or committed to prison.”327 
Nonetheless, the Public Right of Action remains an important tool—and 
perhaps a bargaining chip—to be used by the President in instances when a 
state or local entity has placed the entire country in violation of an international 
legal obligation and there remains no other reasonable option for redressing the 
violation. In such cases, the local entity is placing the entire country at risk of 
sanction or retaliation. That harm can be redressed through a lawsuit to enforce 
the treaty obligation on the local government that is responsible for creating the 
violation—and in a position to stop or prevent it. It would have been legally 
appropriate, for example, (although perhaps politically unimaginable) for the 
federal government to bring a Public Right of Action against Texas for its 
violation of the United States’s obligations under the Vienna Convention. By 
failing to abide by the United States’s obligations under the Convention, Texas 
placed U.S. diplomats and citizens abroad at risk of retaliatory violations. 
Moreover, it damaged the country’s reputation for compliance with its 
international treaty obligations—leading to a unanimous decision by the 
International Court of Justice that the United States had breached its obligations 
under the Convention.328 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Today, more than ever before, international law is a part of daily life. The 
United States is party to hundreds of Article II treaties, many of them covering 
topics of the gravest importance to the country, ranging from the economy,329 
to criminal law enforcement,330 to national security.331 It is thus of no small 
importance that the Supreme Court has cast the legal status of significant 
numbers of these treaties into doubt with its decision in Medellín v. Texas. 
In this Article, we have aimed to bring perspective to Medellín—and to 
the broader debate over the enforcement of international law in U.S. courts—by 
placing it into context. We have shown that for the first century and a half after 
the Founding, the courts of the United States presumed that treaties that created 
 
 327. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 4, art. 36(1)(b); see MICHAEL JOHN 
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private rights were self-executing and created a private right of action. But this 
presumption began to erode well before Medellín—in no small part in response 
to the backlash against the post-War human rights revolution that some 
perceived as a direct threat to racial segregation. Medellín, and an overbroad 
dictum hidden within it, has in the past four years been read by the lower courts 
not as a simple ratification of this more cautious post-War stance, but as a 
complete reversal of the Founding Era presumption. Unless corrected, lower 
courts will likely continue to read Medellín to endorse the conclusion that the 
only treaty that may be directly enforced in court is the rare one that expressly 
states as much.  
Yet this Article also makes clear that the end of direct enforcement of 
Article II treaties in U.S. courts does not spell the end of all enforcement of 
Article II treaties in U.S. courts. For there remain several ways in which the 
courts allow treaties to be used even when they do not give rise to a private 
right of action. We call these “indirect enforcement,” “defensive enforcement,” 
and “interpretive enforcement,” and we show how they operate to enforce 
treaty obligations in ways that are not always noticed but are nonetheless 
deeply influential. 
This fuller picture of the enforcement of international law in U.S. courts 
allows us to see the peaks and the valleys more clearly. We see that the 
problem is at once more and less dire than sometimes acknowledged—lower 
courts have made much more than observers predicted of the Medellín dictum 
and yet there remain many ways aside from direct enforcement of treaty 
obligations to enforce treaties in court. Armed with this more complete 
understanding of the challenge, we are better positioned to make and evaluate 
proposals for improving enforcement. 
Our proposals acknowledge that the problem of international law 
enforcement is not simply one for the courts to solve. Our proposals—for 
legislative enactment, for clear statements by the executive, and for use of the 
Public Right of Action—call for Congress and the President to respond to a 
need that is as much within their power and responsibility to address as it is 
within the courts’. The President and the Senate, after all, concluded the Article 
II treaties now called into doubt—and they must now work, together with the 
courts, to put the doubts to rest. 
 
